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Revisiting Rejection: Secured Party
Interests in Leases and Executory
Contracts
Laura B. Bartell*
The goal of Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code is
to promote credit transactions by making secured financing operate
within a simple, unified structure that would be less costly and
more certain than the panoply of prior security devices.' The
Code has been wildly successful in achieving that objective.2 As
the United States economy has become more service-oriented and
less centered on the production and distribution of "hard goods,"
the credit markets have also moved towards creative financing
techniques that rely on the valuation and securitization of intangi-
ble assets, frequently those represented by contractual rights.3
When beneficiaries of those contractual rights suffer financial
reverses and seek protection of the Bankruptcy Code,4 it provides
* Associate Professor of Law at Wayne State University Law School. I would like to
extend my thanks to my colleagues John F. Dolan and Charles W. Mooney, Jr., who
provided critical comments on drafts of this article.
1. U.C.C. § 9-101, Official cmt.; see also Grant Gilmore, The Secured Transactions
Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 36 (1951) ("The proposal
is to make the taking of security easy, cheap, and certain.").
2. One commentator has estimated that approximately two trillion dollars in secured
debts was held by domestic lenders by the mid-1990s. See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the
Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 627 (1997).
3. See Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1061, 1062 & Appendix A (1996); Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured
Creditor's Perspective, 76 TEX. L. REV. 595, 606-609 & n.46 (1998); Christopher W. Frost,
Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 TUL. L. REV. 101, 104 (1997); Derrick
Allen Dyer, The Impact of Dilution in Asset Securitization: Commercial Separation Anxiety,
66 Miss. L.J. 407, 407-08 (1996); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization,
1 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 133, 154 (1994); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts are Greater Than the
Whole: How Securitization of Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and
Open the Capital Markets to Middle-Market Companies, 2 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 139, 140
(1993); Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current
Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1371-72 (1991).
4. The Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") was originally enacted by the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
them the legal option of assuming the contract, thereby receiving
the benefits of its provisions at the cost of meeting its obligations
on a priority basis, or rejecting the contract, thereby foregoing all
benefits but absolving themselves of further obligations and
relegating the other party to the status of pre-petition creditor for
unsatisfied liabilities.5 To illustrate this in simple terms, suppose
a company is a party to two agreements; one is a lease with a third
party under which the company is the lessee, and the other is a
contract to purchase goods at a fixed price. When the company
files for protection under the Bankruptcy Code, section 365 of the
Code allows the company to reassess the benefits and detriments
of each of these agreements. With respect to the lease, if compara-
ble property is currently available to the debtor for a lower cost
than the rent established by the third party lease, the debtor may
choose to reject the lease and vacate the premises in favor of a
more advantageous arrangements elsewhere. A rejection results in
a deemed "breach" of the lease as of the time immediately prior to
the filing of the petition under section 365(g) of the Code, and the
lessor will have a claim in respect of such breach under section
502(g). Similarly, if the goods subject to the contract are now
available at a lower cost than the fixed price established in the
contract, the company will reject the contract and obtain the goods
elsewhere on better terms, and the other party to the contract will
receive a pre-petition claim in respect of the breach of contract.
Alternatively, if the rent under the lease is at or below market, or
if the goods under the contract would now cost the company more
than the contract price, the company may assume the lease or the
contract, securing for itself the ongoing benefits of those agree-
ments.
Assumption of executory contracts and leases poses few
conceptual problems. The pre-bankruptcy obligations of the debtor
under those agreements become obligations of the bankrupt estate
and remain enforceable against the estate after assumption (as
§§ 101-1330 (1994)).
5. Section 365(a) of the Code provides as follows:
Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title [dealing with
commodity broker liquidations] and in subsections (b) [limiting ability to assume
where there has been a default], (c) [prohibiting assumption under certain
circumstances] and (d) [providing time period during which assumption must
occur, if at all] of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may
assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1994).
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administrative claims) and against the debtor after it emerges from
bankruptcy.6
By contrast, the impact of rejection on the non-debtor party to
an executory contract or lease has been a source of some confusion
to courts and commentators. Many courts have concluded that
rejection of a contract or lease results in its termination.7
6. See id. §§ 365(g)(2)(A) (rejection of contract or lease previously assumed is deemed
breach as of time of rejection); 503(b)(1)(A) (defining administrative expenses); 1142(a)
(requiring debtor to carry out plan of reorganization); 1141(b) (property of estate vests in
debtor free and clear of all claims except as otherwise provided in plan).
7. See, e.g., In re Elm Inn, Inc., 942 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1991) (upon deemed
rejection of lease under Section 365(d)(4) of Code by debtor/lessee, "the debtor's possessory
interest in the lease terminated"); Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers,
Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986) (holding that the
rejection of executory technology licensing agreement deprives licensee of all contract rights
in technology); In re Couture, 202 B.R. 837, 842 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1996) (holding that the lease
"terminated by operation of the Bankruptcy Code" when lease was not assumed); In re
Elephant Bar Restaurant, Inc., 195 B.R. 353, 356 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) ("On the basis of
the Chapter 7 trustee's deemed rejection of the lease ... , such lease is hereby legally
terminated with respect to the debtor."); In re Harborview Development 1986 Limited
Partnership, 152 B.R. 897, 900 (D.S.C. 1993) (holding that when insider relationships were
involved, bankruptcy court was not clearly erroneous in determining that rejected tease was
terminated); In re Carlton Restaurant, Inc., 151 B.R. 353, 356-57 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993)
(after rejection by the debtor/lessor a lessee has only those rights afforded by Section 365(h),
not those set forth in lease); Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. Kaplan, 147 B.R. 96, 100 (D. Del. 1992),
affd, 998 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir. 1993) (table) ("Following rejection of the Lease, [debtor/lessee]
had no statutory, contractual or possessory rights in the Property .... "); In re A. J. Lane &
Co., 107 B.R. 435, 438 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (rejection of repurchase option contained in
deed terminates option); In re Stalter & Co., 99 B.R. 327, 331 (E.D La. 1989) (rejection of
master lease "terminated" lease); R & 0 Elevator Co. v. Harmon, 93 B.R. 667, 671 (D.
Minn. 1988) ("Rejection of an executory contract terminates the obligation of the parties
under the contract."); In re Gillis, 92 B.R. 461, 465 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1988) ("[T]he effect of
this rejection [of the lease] is to terminate the Lease."); In re Giles Associates, 92 B.R. 695,
696 (Bankr. W.D. Texas 1988) ("[A]utomatic rejection of the lease under Section 365(d)(4)
terminates a lease as to all parties .... "); In re Bernard, 69 B.R. 13, 14-15 (Bankr. D. Haw.
1986) ("If it is determined that a lease is still in existence" after rejection, "the purpose of
Section 365(d)(4) will not be achieved"); In re Spats Restaurant Saloon, 64 B.R. 442, 445
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1986) ("Upon rejection, the lease is terminated."); In re Southwest Aircraft
Services, 53 B.R. 805, 810 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1985), affid, 66 Bankr. 121 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1986), rev'd on other grounds, 831 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1206 (1988)
("[Ilt is clear Congress intended that rejecting a lease terminates the lease."); In re Hawaii
Dimensions, 39 B.R. 606, 608 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1984), affd, 47 Bankr. 425 (D. Haw. 1985)
("[R]ejection [of a lease] constitutes termination"); In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc., 30
B.R. 642, 650 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that a rejected sublease is "to be considered
terminated immediately before the filing date"); In re Mead, 28 B.R. 1000, 1002 (E.D. Pa.
1983) ("The court must deem the lease rejected and terminated by operation of law"); In re
Kors, Inc., 22 B.R. 19, 20 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982) (upon date of deemed rejection "the lease
is considered terminated"); In re New York Investors Mutual Group, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 51,
54 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (holding that equitable title of vendee under executory contract for sale
of real property is "subject to" right of trustee to reject the contract, and vendee has only
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:2
Recent seminal articles by Michael T. Andrew and Jay Lawrence
Westbrook have contested this conclusion, suggesting that rejection
of a contract or lease by the debtor does not affect the enforceabili-
ty of property rights in the other party created thereby.8 Their
analysis has proven convincing to many courts.9 To use the phrase
a claim for damages for breach); Mayfield Smithson Enterprises v. Com-Quip, Inc., 896 P.2d
1156, 1162 (N.M. 1995) ("[R]ejection terminates the lease .. "); Giddings Petroleum Corp.
v. Peterson Food Mart, Inc., 859 S.W.2d 89, 93 (Tex. App. 1993) ("The weight of federal
authority holds that the trustee's rejection of an executory contract or lease effectively
terminates the contract or lease."); Cf. In re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d 1339, 1352
(9th Cir. 1983) ("Until rejection ... the executory contract continues in effect .... ");
Federal's, Inc. v. Edmonton Investment Co., 555 F.2d 577, 579 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that
executory contracts "remain in effect unless" rejected); Smith v. Hill, 317 F.2d 539, 542 n.6
(9th Cir. 1963) (noting that executory contracts continue in effect unless rejected);
Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power Co. v. United Rys. Co., 85 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1936)
(holding that executory contract "remains in force until it is rejected"); In re Continental
Country Club, Inc., 114 B.R. 763, 767 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (finding debtor failed to
satisfy requirements for rejection and thus executory contract "was not the subject of
termination under 11 U.S.C. § 365").
8. See Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts Revisited: A Reply to Professor West-
brook," 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 17 (1991) [hereinafter, Andrew, Reply]); Michael T. Andrew,
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding 'Rejection', 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845,884
(1988) [hereinafter, Andrew, Executory Contracts]; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional
Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 239 (1989) [hereinafter, Westbrook,
Functional Analysis]; see also William E. Winfield, Rejection of Nonresidential Leases of Real
Property in Bankruptcy: What Happens to the Mortgagee's Security Interest?, 17 PEPP. L.
REV. 429 (1990).
9. See, e.g., Medical Malpractice Ins. Assoc. v. Hirsch (In re Lavigne), 114 F.3d 379,
386-87 (2d Cir. 1997) ("While rejection is treated as a breach, it does not completely
terminate the contract."); In re Garfinkle, 577 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that the
rejection of lease by debtor/lessee did not terminate leasehold estate); In re El Paso
Refinery, L.P., 220 B.R. 37, 40-41 & n.7 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998) ("[R]ejection by the trustee
is not an avoidance of the contract or the debtor's obligations under it.") (emphasis in
original); In re Bacon, 212 B.R. 66, 69 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997) (rejection did not terminate
residential lease, but abandoned it to debtor); In re Brown, 211 B.R. 183 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1997), rev'd, No. Civ. A. 97-5425 1997 WL 786994 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 1997) (rejection of
executory recording contracts did not invalidate contracts); In re Tri-Glied, Ltd., 179 B.R.
1014, 1017-18 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejection of lease by debtor/lessee in prior Chapter
11 case did not terminate lease but terminated debtor's possessory interest); In re South
Motor Co. of Dade County, 161 B.R. 532, 546 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) (rejection of
automobile sales and service agreement by automotive dealer "has absolutely no effect upon
[its] continued existence"); Societe Nationale Algerienne v. Distrigas Corp., 80 B.R. 606, 608-
09 (D. Mass. 1987) (rejection did not terminate arbitration clause in executory contract); In
re Blackburn, 88 B.R. 273, 276 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1988) ("Neither rejection of a lease under
Section 365(d)(1), nor entry of a discharge order terminates a lease."); In re Picnic 'N
Chicken, 58 B.R. 523, 526 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986) ("[R]ejection by the debtor does not
necessarily terminate a lease agreement for all purposes."); In re Storage Technology Corp.,
53 B.R. 471, 475 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985) ("[Rlejection of a lease does not have the conclusive
effect of terminating it."); In re 1438 Meridian Place, N.W., Inc., 11 B.R. 352, 352 (Bankr.
D.D.C. 1981) ("[R]ejection of a lease does not in any way affect a tenant's leasehold
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employed by these commentators-and that was adopted by the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission and was included in its
suggested revisions to section 365 of the Code'°-rejection is not
an "avoiding power".11
It is the thesis of this Article that, although rejection is not an
"avoiding power" in the traditional sense, section 365 was intended
to allow a debtor the opportunity to "undo" an executory contract
or lease at the price of creating a bankruptcy claim for breach. A
rejected contract, through the operation of the bankruptcy process,
becomes unenforceable and thus is in fact terminated both in fact
and at law. I will argue that treating rejection as analogous to an
avoiding power is not only mandated by application of traditional
common law contract doctrine, but is also the only result that is
consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of bankruptcy
law-the much vaunted "fresh start" policy.
However, this Article goes one step further, examining the
rights of the third party who may be involved in the contractual
relationship between debtor and non-debtor-the secured creditor
with an interest in the rights of the debtor or non-debtor party to
the rejected agreement. I will suggest that in those situations of
most concern to Messrs. Westbrook and Andrew-when there is a
property right created pursuant to the rejected contract or
lease t -if a secured creditor has taken a security interest in that
property right and/or the personal property created by the rejected
contract or lease itself, its security interest should not be destroyed
merely because the contract or lease terminates. Rather, if the
secured creditor has a security interest in property that existed
prior to the lease or contract, that security interest should "ride
through" the rejection with the collateral into the hands of the
ultimate beneficiary of the rejection. If, instead, the secured
estate."); Cobabe v. Stanger, 844 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1992) ("[Rlejection of an executory
contract does not, without more, terminate a personal services contract ....").
10. See Report of National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Section 2.4.1, at 461 (1997);
see also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Commission's Recommendations Concerning the
Treatment of Bankruptcy Contracts, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 470-472 (1997).
11. See Andrew, Executory Contracts, supra note 8, at 901-931; Andrew, Reply, supra
note 8, at 17; Westbrook, Functional Analysis, supra note 8, at 270-75.
12. Professor Westbrook eschews the term "property right," preferring the term
"Interest in the Thing Itself" or "ITI" to avoid any need to wrestle with "that ubiquitous
concept, 'property'." Westbrook, Functional Analysis, supra note 8, at 258. Mr. Andrew and
I, perhaps less intimidated by our inability to define the concept, are comfortable with the
terminology. See Andrew, Reply, supra note 8, at 9.
1999]
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creditor's security interest attaches only to property created by the
lease or contract, that security interest extends to the proceeds of
that property upon rejection, which should include the property
underlying the contract or lease. 3
For purposes of this Article, I will be using two simple models
of executory contracts pursuant to which a property interest is
transferred to illustrate my thesis, one involving a lease, and one
involving a license. 4 Because leases of real property are subject
to the vagaries of state real property law (and because the impact
of rejection has been addressed in part by Congress in sec-
tion 365(h) 5), the lease will involve personal property, equipment.
This equipment is owned in the state property law sense by the
lessor. When the lessor enters into the lease, the lessor continues
to "own" the equipment as against the world, but it has limited its
ownership to the extent and for the period provided in the lease as
against the other party to the lease, the lessee. To that extent, the
lessee can be seen as having obtained property rights in the
equipment, representing a subset of the property rights originally
held by the lessor (which can be called P1). A diagram of this
transaction, which I will call "Lease Model," using the terminology
I will be employing in this Article, would look as follows:
OWNER UNDERLYING OTHER
PROPERTY PARTY
LESSOR EQUIPMENT LEESEE
LEASE
LESSOR > LESSEE
13. If we were to use Professor Westbrook's terminology, the proceeds should include
the "Thing Itself" in which the "ITI" was created. See supra note 12.
14. My examples are limited to contracts or leases in which a property right to some
underlying property is conveyed. In a normal supply contract-such as the contract for the
sale or purchase of onions used by Professor Westbrook to illustrate the economic
consequences of assumption and rejection, see Westbrook, supra note 8, at XXX, there is no
property right in any underlying property created. Rather, the onions belong to one party
to the contract or the other (ignoring for purposes of this overbroad assertion the "special
property and [ ] insurable interest in goods [acquired by the buyer] by identification of
existing goods as goods to which the contract refers" under § 2-501 of the U.C.C.).
15. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 103:2
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When a Licensor enters into a license, it conveys to the
Licensee the right to exploit the intellectual property in the area
and for the period specified. The Licensor continues to "own" the
intellectual property, but subject to the limitations on that owner-
ship provided in the license. The rights of the Licensee (P1) can be
seen as a subset of the ownership rights of the Licensor in the
intellectual property. A diagram of this transaction, which I will
call "License Model," using similar terminology would be as
follows:
OWNER UNDERLYING OTHER
PROPERTY PARTY
LICENSOR INTELLECTUAL LICENSEE
PROPERTY
LICENSE
LICENSOR- -> LICENSEE
Part I of this Article takes the terms used by the Bankruptcy
Code with respect to executory contracts and leases and applies
state law concepts to provide definitional context. Part II analyzes
the impact of bankruptcy on the relationships created by a lease or
1999]
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executory contract. Part III looks at the impact of rejection on the
lease or contract, analogizing rejection and discharge to common
law concepts of voidability for incapacity or impossibility, and
concludes that, contrary to the views of Messrs. Andrew and
Westbrook, the result must be complete termination of the lease or
contract, including all conveyances of interests in property effected
thereby. Part IV focuses on the property rights of a secured
creditor holding an interest in property rights of a party to a
rejected lease or contract that conveyed an interest in pre-existing
property. The final section of the Article provides some conclu-
sions.
I. Definition of Terms
The Code itself provides no definition of "unexpired lease" or
"executory contract." The legislative history of section 365 suggests
that Congress intended the provision to apply to "contracts on
which performance remains due to some extent on both sides. 16
In so stating Congress was undoubtedly influenced by the standard
formulation enunciated by Professor Vern Countryman five years
earlier: an executory contract is "a contract under which the
obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract
are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete
performance would constitute a material breach excusing the
performance of the other."17 Considered under this formulation,
"unexpired leases," which are also subject to rejection or assump-
tion under section 365 of the Code, are simply one category of
executory contracts, in that the lessor will necessarily have a
continuing (unperformed) obligation to provide the leased goods or
premises for the remaining term, and the lessee will have a
continuing (unperformed) obligation to make payment for those
goods or premises, and a default by either party in performing
those obligations would excuse the other party from perfor-
mance.
18
16. S. REP. No. XX-989, at 58 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5844 H.
REP. No. XX-595, at 347 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6303.
17. Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439,
460 (1973).
18. I believe that Professor Westbrook would disagree with my assertion that an
unexpired lease is necessarily executory. Professor Westbrook would likely conclude that
the initial transfer of possession of the leased property completes the performance of the
obligations of the lessor, and absent ancillary obligations imposed on the lessor under the
[Vol. 103:2
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The Countryman formulation has garnered some criticism
when applied to rejection of leases and executory contracts. Some
argue that it appears to create a pre-condition to rejection that is
unwarranted, because rejection is the equivalent of a breach of the
contract (a decision by the estate not to perform) that would be
permitted to any contract party willing to suffer the consequences
under non-bankruptcy law.19 Others contend that the entire
concept of "executoriness" as a condition to operation of section
365 of the Code is itself wrong-headed, and that the ability of the
trustee to assume or reject contracts should turn on whether the
estate will benefit from assumption or rejection rather than on
whether the contract or lease is "executory.
20
For purposes of the analysis in this Article, the "executoriness"
of the contract or lease is not of any significance.21 In reaching
lease are unperformed, the lease, although unexpired, is not "executory." See Westbrook,
Functional Analysis, supra note 8, at 238.
19. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 108
(1986). Professor Jackson argues that a party in possession of property pursuant to a
rejected contract would not be dispossessed by a breach of contract by the owner of that
property outside of bankruptcy and therefore should not be so dispossessed upon rejection
in bankruptcy. See id. at 110. Although I agree with Professor Jackson that under nonbank-
ruptcy law the non-breaching property possessor would not be involuntarily dispossessed, I
believe that he gives insufficient weight to the fact that the decision of the possessor outside
of bankruptcy to retain the property is the functional equivalent of partial specific perfor-
mance of the rejected contract and is precluded by the bankruptcy policy of equality of
treatment. See infra notes 129-132.
20. This is known as the "functional approach." See Olin McGill & Francis G. Conrad,
Exorcising Executoriness: Functionalist Arguments and Incantations to Avoid Meeting the
Devil in the Woods, 1995-96 Norton Ann. Surv. Bankr. L. 137, 144 n.22 (1996); Andrew,
Reply, supra note 8, at 1; Westbrook, Functional Analysis, supra note 8, at 282-83; see also,
In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 687, 703 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In
re Waldron, 36 B.R. 633, 637-38 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 785 F.2d 936
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1028 (1986); Report of National Bankruptcy Review
Commission, Section 2.4.4 (1997) (recommending elimination of "executoriness" as condition
to assumption or rejection).
21. I have much sympathy for the criticisms of Messrs. Westbrook and Andrew and the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission with respect to the executoriness precondition to
assumption or rejection, but my own perspective is slightly different. I believe that the
"material breach" test proposed by Professor Countryman should be seen simply as an effort
to distinguish between a contract that is so far performed that the bankruptcy goals furthered
by a trustee's option to reexamine the wisdom of honoring it do not outweigh the need for
finality in commercial transactions, and a contract that is sufficiently unperformed to
conclude that commercial finality would not be violated by providing the trustee a "second
look" at the benefits and detriments of performance pursuant to Section 365. See Vern
Countryman, supra note 17, at 457 (1973) (suggesting that a contract between a debtor and
a building contractor under which the contractor has performed all tasks other than proper
connection of the water should not be deemed executory and subject to assumption or
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my conclusions, I have assumed that the contract or lease at issue
is subject to rejection by the debtor under whatever definition the
court chooses to employ. Rather than seeing the definition of
"executory" as key, I see the impact of that rejection on the party
to that contract other than the debtor (who will hereinafter be
referred to as the "non-debtor party" or "NDP"), and on any third
party holding a security interest or lien on the contractual interests
of either the debtor or the NDP (who will hereinafter be referred
to as the "secured third party" or "STP"), as turning on an earlier
analytical phase, the identification of what a contract or lease is and
the property rights involved. These definitions and their conse-
quences are a matter of state law, and we are aided in our
definitional search by recourse to the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C.").
Contracts have been viewed as "nothing more than mixed
assets and liabilities arising out of the same transaction."22
However useful this conceptualization, its terminology matches
accounting better than bankruptcy. Bankruptcy law is aimed at the
protection and allocation of property of the debtor,23 and the
discharge of "debts."24  Therefore, a contract for purposes of a
bankruptcy case can be described better as a legal obligation that
creates property interests and debts. The impact of bankruptcy and
rejection on executory contracts and leases can then be analyzed by
focusing on the property rights and debts of the debtor, rather than
on the debtor's assets or liabilities. To understand that impact, the
property rights involved in a contract or lease involving the transfer
of an interest in property must be analyzed.
As a preliminary matter, before any contract or lease is
entered into by the parties, one of the parties (who will be
hereafter referred to as the "Owner") has an interest in some
underlying property (UP)-personal or real property-of which the
other party or parties (who will be called the "OP") wishes to
obtain all or part. Unless the contractual arrangement reached by
rejection). I do not, however, as Professor Westbrook seems to do, equate "finality" in this
context with the transfer of a property right by the debtor to the other party to the contract.
See Westbrook, Functional Analysis, supra note 8, at 238.
22. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 106; see also Andrew, Executory Contracts, supra note
8, at 855.
23. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 (1994) (identifying the property of the bankruptcy estate),
362 (imposing automatic stay), 507 (establishing priority for distribution).
24. See, e.g., id. §§ 727(b), 1141(d)(1)(A), 1228(c), 1328(c). A "debt" is defined as
"liability on a claim" in section 101(12).
[Vol. 103:2
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the parties is a contract of sale,' the existence of a contract or
lease with respect to the UP will not affect title to the UP26 The
Owner to whom the UP originally "belongs" will continue to
"own" the UP. As to the Owner, the contract or lease does not
create any new property rights in the UP; it merely carves out from
those existing rights a subset of rights in the UP and confers that
subset to the OP.
In the hands of the OP, the "contract" or "lease agreement"
itself is not property but instead transfers property interests in the
UP, representing that subset of the Owner's property rights
conferred on the OP by enforceable agreement. Section 1-201(11)
of the U.C.C. defines "contract" as "the total legal obligation which
results from the parties' agreement as affected by this Act and any
other applicable rules of law." That "contract" is likely to be
embodied in an "agreement" of the parties, meaning their bargain
in fact.2 ' As section 1-201(3) of the U.C.C. emphasizes, whether
25. In most jurisdictions, under the theory of "equitable conversion" the execution of
the contract of sale relating to real property gives the buyer an ownership interest in the
property itself and then transforms the seller's interest therein to personal property (the right
to receive payment from the buyer). See generally 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§§ 11.22-.35 (1952); ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, 3A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 667 (2d ed.
1962).
26. As a matter of pure feudal theory, occupancy by a tenant did not affect seisin in the
landlord. The landlord's present estate in the land was merely burdened by the term of
years in the tenant. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 25, § 3.1, at 176-177.
Although it has become common to refer to the creation of a leasehold as transferring to the
lessee a present interest (an estate for years) constituting a non-freehold estate in land with
the lessor retaining a reversion (or transferring a remainder to a third party), the fee simple
ownership of the property remains in the lessor. See generally THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL
G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 38-42 (2d ed. 1984).
Technically speaking, therefore, the creation of a lease was merely a matter of contract, not
conveyance of property. See generally William M. McGovern, The Historical Conception of
a Lease for Years, 23 UCLA L. REV. 501 (1976). Consistent with feudal treatment, it is the
person in whose name title to real property is recorded (as between the lessor and lessee,
generally the lessor) who is considered the owner thereof for property tax purposes; 49 AM.
JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 446 (1995). The tension between property and contract
theories of leases has been a rich source of scholarly writing. See, e.g., Edward Chase, The
Property-Contract Theme in Landlord and Tenant Law: A Critical Commentary of Schoshin-
ski's American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 189 (1982); John Forrester
Hicks, The Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443 (1972); John
A. Humbach, The Common-Law Conception of Leasing: Mitigation, Habitability, and
Dependence of Covenants, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 1213 (1983). Although concepts of seisin have
no impact on title to personal property, there is no reason to treat leasehold interests in
personal property differently from those in real property insofar as they affect ownership.
27. The U.C.C. defines "agreement" as "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in
their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or
usage of trade or course of performance .... " U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1977).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:2
that agreement has legal consequences is governed by the U.C.C.
when applicable provisions exist, but is otherwise determined by
the law of contracts pursuant to section 1-103 of the U.C.C., which
provides for the supplementation of the U.C.C. by principles of law
and equity.28
Similar to a "contract," a "lease contract" is defined under the
U.C.C. as: "the total legal obligation that results from the lease
agreement as affected by this Article and any other applicable rules
of law.",29  A "lease agreement" is the bargain of the lessor and
lessee with respect to a "lease,, 30  and a "lease" is defined as "a
transfer of the right to possession and use of goods for a term in
return for consideration ....
The contract or lease has a significant impact on property
rights. A lease affects the rights of both Lessee (OP) and Lessor
(Owner). With respect to the Lessee, the lease creates a new
property interest, characterized as a "leasehold interest, 3 2 which
is personal property.33  In the Lease Model described earlier, the
leasehold interest would be P1. If the leased property is goods, the
leasehold interest will be classified by the nature of the leased
goods in the hands of the lessee, for example, equipment, invento-
ry, consumer goods, or farm products. 34 This leasehold interest of
28. Section 1-201(3) concludes: "Whether an agreement has legal consequences is
determined by the provisions of this Act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of contracts
(Section 1-103) .... " The U.C.C. further provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and
equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its
provisions.
Id. § 1-103.
29. U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(J) (1987).
30. Id. § 2A-103(1)(k).
31. Id. § 2A-103(1)j).
32. The U.C.C. characterizes a "leasehold interest" as "the interest of the lessor or the
lessee under a lease contract." U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(m).
33. Even if the leased property is real estate and the leasehold is an interest in land, for
historical reasons leasehold interests have always been categorized as personal property
("chattels real"). See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY supra note 25 § 3.12, at 205;
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 8 cmt. c (1936).
34. Section 9-109 of the U.C.C. provides:
Goods are
(1) "consumer goods" if they are used or bought for use primarily for
personal, family or household purposes;
(2) "equipment" if they are used or bought for use primarily in business
(including farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a non-profit organization
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the Lessee represents "the right to possession and use" of the
leased premises or goods,35 for the term of the lease. Absent the
lease, the Lessee had no property interest in the UP (the equip-
ment in the Lease Model), and apart from the leasehold interest,
the lease gives the Lessee no other property rights.
In the case of the Lessor or Owner, that is, the "person who
transfers the right to possession and use of goods under a lease, 3
6
the "leasehold interest" under the lease consists of two property
rights, only one of which is newly-created. The first is the right to
consideration from the Lessee paid for the Lessee's leasehold
interest (often colloquially labeled "rent"). Absent the lease, this
property right would not exist. If the Lessor uses this newly-
created personal property as collateral, it is classified as "chattel
paper" under the U.C.C.37 The second is what has been labeled
or a governmental subdivision or agency or if the goods are not included in the
definitions of inventory, farm products or consumer goods;
(3) "farm products" if they are crops or livestock or supplies used or
produced in farming operations or if they are products of crops or livestock in
their unmanufactured states (such as ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk
and eggs), and if they are in the possession of a debtor engaged in raising,
fattening, grazing or other farming operations. If goods are farm products they
are neither equipment nor inventory;
(4) "inventory" if they are held by a person who holds them for sale or
lease or to be furnished under contracts of service or if he has so furnished them,
or if they are raw materials, work in process or materials used or consumed in a
business. Inventory of a person is not to be classified as his equipment.
35. The definition of "lessee" in Section 2A-103(1)(n) of the U.C.C. provides that it is
"a person who acquires the right to possession and use of goods under a lease ... 
36. Id. § 2A-103(1)(p).
37. "Chattel paper" is "a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary obligation
and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods . I..." d. § 9-105(1)(b). The monetary
obligation satisfying the definitional requirement is the consideration the lessee agrees to pay
for the possession and use of the goods.
Any rights of the lessor created by the lease other than the right to receive payment
are also characterized as part of the "chattel paper" even though they do not fit neatly into
the definition. The draftsmen of the U.C.C. wished to avoid bifurcating the payment rights
and other rights inhering in a lease, and specified that all lease rights were to be treated as
chattel paper. See Id. § 9-106 Official Cmt.
A security interest in chattel paper may be perfected either by filing a financing
statement, see id. § 9-304(1), or by the secured party's taking possession of the collateral, see
id. § 9-305. To perfect by possession of a lease constituting chattel paper, the secured party
must hold the "original counterpart" of the lease. Compare In re ICS Cybernetics, Inc., 123
B.R. 467 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 123 B.R. 480 (N.D.N.Y.1990) (holding that the
lender perfected by holding original counterpart of equipment schedule) with In re Funding
Systems Asset Management Corp., 111 B.R. 500 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that the
lender not perfected by possession of one of three original equipment schedules). If the
lender fails to perfect by possession, a purchaser of the lease, which may be another secured
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the "lessor's residual interest,"38 which represents the interest of
the Lessor in the UP after the lease contract expires, terminates, or
is cancelled. This interest is not a new property interest; rather, it
represents the original property interest held by the Lessor in the
UP reduced by the subset of rights, which is the "leasehold
interest" or P1 under my model, conferred on the Lessee. If the
Lessor uses this property interest as collateral, it will be classified
as inventory because the goods have been furnished under a lease
pursuant to section 9-109(4)." Thus, in the Lease Model, the
Lessor has a residual interest in the equipment, which constitutes
inventory in its hands.
In the case of contracts other than lease contracts that transfer
an interest in property, typically the Owner agrees to provide
property to another (the OP) in exchange for money. In the
License Model, the Licensor (Owner) agrees to transfer an interest
in the intellectual property (the underlying property or UC) to the
Licensee (OP) for an agreed compensation. The property interest
of the owner of the UC in payment pursuant to the contract,
labeled under the 1962 official version of the U.C.C. as a "contract
right,, 40 now falls under the rubric of "account., 41 This account
is a newly-created personal property interest. Any interest of a
party to a contract that does not represent a right to payment
would be characterized as a "general intangible," which is defined
to include any personal property not otherwise categorized.42 The
party, see id. § 1-201(32)-(33), who gives new value and takes possession of it in the ordinary
course of his business can obtain priority even over a lender who properly perfected by filing.
See id. § 9-308.
38. Id. § 2A-103(i)(q).
39. A security interest in the lessor's interest in leased goods will, as a practical matter,
have to be perfected by filing a financing statement under section 9-304(1). Although
security interests in goods can be perfected by possession, see id. § 9-305, because a lease
transfers possession of the goods to the lessee, the secured party will not be able to perfect
by possession. Possession of the lease constituting chattel paper does not perfect a security
interest in the leased goods. See, e.g., In re Commercial Management Serv., Inc., 127 B.R.
296 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
40. Section 9-106 of the 1962 version of the U.C.C. defined "contract right" as "any
right to payment under a contract not yet earned by performance and not evidenced by an
instrument or chattel paper."
41. Article Nine of the U.C.C. includes within the definition of "account": "any right
to payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an
instrument or chattel paper, whether or not it has been earned by performance." U.C.C. §
9-106 (1977).
42. "General intangibles" is defined as "any personal property (including things in
action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, investment
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interest of the Licensee to the intellectual property, which would
not exist in the absence of the contract, would be characterized as
a general intangible, as would any rights of the Licensor against the
licensee other than the right to receive payment. Note again that
the contract creates new property rights that did not exist before,
but does not affect the owner's pre-existing property rights in the
UP, except to the extent a subset of property rights in the UP (P1
in the License Model) has been defined and conveyed to the other
party by enforceable provisions of the contract.
II. Effect of Bankruptcy and Pre-action Status of Lease or
Executory Contract
What happens to these property rights when the Owner or OP
files for protection under the Bankruptcy Code? For purposes of
this discussion, the party so seeking protection will be referred to
as the "Debtor," and the party not seeking protection will be called
the "non-debtor party" or "NDP." The Debtor could be the
Owner, in which case the NDP is the OP, or the Debtor may be
the OP, in which case the NDP is the Owner. The Bankruptcy
Code purports to affect only the property of the Debtor, and does
not distinguish between the pre-bankruptcy status of the contract-
ing party as Owner or OR
A. Owner as Debtor
The commencement of the bankruptcy case under the Code
results in the creation of an "estate," comprised of "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commence-
ment of the case., 43 The universe of property interests belonging
to the Debtor for purposes of the Code is defined by reference to
state property law, both real and personal.' Therefore, in
applying the operative provisions of section 541 to a lease or
executory contract existing at the time of the commencement of the
bankruptcy case, we must again look at the property interests
related to them.
property, rights to proceeds of written letters of credit, and money." Id.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994).
44. See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55-56 (1979); Baker v. Harris Pine
Mills (In re Harris Pine Mills), 862 F.2d 217, 220 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 687, 710 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re TIS, Inc., 125 B.R.
411, 413-14 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991).
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First, as previously discussed, the Owner has a property
interest in the UP that constitutes his "ownership" or "title" or
"legal interest" to that UP This property interest in the UP
existed before there was any lease or contract, and will immediately
become an asset of the estate pursuant to section 541.45 In the
Lease Model, this means that the equipment itself becomes an asset
of the estate. In the License Model, the intellectual property
becomes estate property.
Second, the Owner has property interests created by the lease
or executory contract itself. In the case of a lease (as in the Lease
Model), this property interest (the lessor's "leasehold interest")
includes the right to consideration for providing possession and use
of premises or goods. In the case of an executory contract (like the
license in the License Model), this property interest ("account" and
"general intangibles") represents the package of benefits accruing
to the Owner as a result of the contract, usually consisting primarily
of the right to receive payment. These property interests immedi-
ately become part of the bankrupt estate under section 541. 46
45. Unlike Michael T. Andrew, I do not believe that the Owner's interest in the UP that
becomes part of the estate is properly characterized as merely a "residual" or "reversionary"
interest. See Andrew, Executory Contracts, supra note 8, at 904-05; Andrew, Reply, supra
note 8, at 10. Until the debtor's decision to assume or reject is made, the estate's legal
interest in the UP is limited by the equitable interest of the OP. However, the estate is com-
prised not only of the Debtor's equitable interest in the UP, but also the Debtor's legal
interest, which is its title to or ownership of the UP. This legal interest may be subject to
limitations at the moment of filing (representing the property interest of the OP in the UP,
or P1 in my two models), but is fully included in the estate.
46. Michael T. Andrew would argue that the property interests created by leases or
contracts do not become part of the estate pursuant to section 541 unless and until assumed
pursuant to section 365. In his seminal article, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 59 U.
COLO. L. REV. 845 (1988), he traced the historical antecedents of the concept of assumption
and rejection, and concluded that courts were unwilling to impose on a bankrupt party the
administrative liabilities believed to accompany the inclusion of the asset represented by a
lease or contract in the bankrupt estate. See id. at 856-861; see also Douglas Bordewieck &
Vern Countryman, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11
Debtors," 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293, 303 (1983). Bordewick and Countryman state:
"Were it not for section 365, all contracts and leases in which the debtor had a
legal or equitable prepetition interest would become property of the estate under
section 541(a)(1). Perhaps section 365 should be viewed as a limitation on section
541(a)(1) giving the debtor... an option to decide whether executory contracts
and unexpired leases should become property of the estate."
Id. at 303. In re Tleel, 876 F.2d 769, 770 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Lovitt, 757 F.2d 1035, 1041
(9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Cheadle v. Appleatchee Riders Ass'n, 474 U.S. 849 (1985);
In re Tonry, 724 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1984); In re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d
1339, 1351 n.10 (9th Cir. 1983); Fletcher v. Surprise (In re Northern Indiana Oil Co.), 180
F.2d 669, 676 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 824 (1950); Green v. Finnigan Realty Co., 70
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Note that the lease or contract is not affected by section 541
of the Code. Despite its significant impact on pre-existing property
interests and creation of new property interests, the lease or
contract is not itself property because it never becomes a part of
the bankruptcy estate. Nor is the contract immediately enforceable
against the Debtor,47 although it remains enforceable against the
OP48 The thrust of section 365 after the commencement of the
case will be to determine whether the provisions of the lease or
contract, which create new property interests and limit existing
property interests in the UP, will again become enforceable against
the Debtor or become permanently unenforceable, through the
operation of Debtor's election to assume or reject.
B. OP as Debtor
When the OP is the Debtor, there are no property interests in
UP other than those created by the lease or executory contract (P1
in the two models). Those interests ("leasehold interests" and
"general intangibles") automatically become part of the bankrupt
estate by operation of Section 541. Again, the contract or
executory contract, not being property itself, does not become part
of the estate, but remains enforceable against the Owner/NDP by
the OP/Debtor despite the inability of the Owner/NDP to enforce
F.2d 465, 466 (5th Cir. 1934); Cobabe v. Stanger, 844 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1992).
However interesting and even persuasive Andrew's historical analysis may be, section
541 makes no distinction between property of the estate created by lease or executory
contract and other property of the estate. The necessary conclusion, as noted by Professor
Westbrook, is that all property interests ("rights") created by leases or executory contracts
are affected by section 541 and become part of the bankrupt estate. See Westbrook,
Functional Analysis, supra note 8, at 250 & 325; see also In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142, 159-60
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1996); In re Matta, No. 95-10315, 1995 WL 664765, at *3 (Bankr. D. Vt. Nov.
7, 1995); In re The Leslie Fay Companies, Inc., 166 B.R. 802 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994); In re
Seymour, 144 B.R. 524, 528 n.2 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert
Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 687, 702 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
47. See NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 533 (1984) ("[T]he filing of a petition in
bankruptcy ... makes the contract unenforceable."). See generally Douglas W. Bordewieck,
The Postpetition, Pre-Rejection, Pre-Assumption Status of an Executory Contract, 59 AM.
BANK. L.J. 197, 200 (1985).
48. See, e.g., In re Shoppers Paradise, Inc., 8 B.R. 271 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); see
generally Howard C. Buschman III, Benefits and Burdens: Post-Petition Performance of
Unassumed Executory Contracts, 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 341, 345-49 (1988); Bordenwieck, supra
note 47, at 200. Of course, if the Debtor receives benefits from the OP prior to the time a
decision is made on rejection or assumption, the Debtor must pay for the reasonable value
of the benefits. See, e.g., Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 531; Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, 312 U.S. 168,
174 (1941).
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its provisions against the OP/Debtor. The decision to assume or
reject the contract will determine whether the contractual provi-
sions creating these new property interests will be enforceable
against the OP/Debtor by virtue of the OP/Debtor's decision to
assume the contract, or will be rendered permanently unenforce-
able by rejection and therefore ineffective to create the property
interests.
III. Effect of Rejection
When the Debtor elects to reject a lease or executory contract,
the Code does not fully articulates the consequences of that
decision. Congress simply provided that rejection of an executory
contract or unexpired lease "constitutes a breach of such contract
or lease" as of the specified time.49 Because a breach of contract
gives rise to a right to payment at law or in equity under state law,
such breach gives rise to a "claim" under section 101(5) of the
Code 5' and the OP may file a proof of claim and obtain a distribu-
tion in respect thereof with all other unsecured claimants.
51
49. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1) (1994). That section provides:
(g) Except as provided in subsections (h)(2) and (i)(2) of this section, the
rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a
breach of such contract or lease-
(1) if such contract or lease has not been assumed under this section or
under a plan confirmed under chapter 9, 11 or 13 of this title, immediately before
the date of the filing of the petition ....
50. Section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "claim" very broadly to include:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy
is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, secured, or unsecured[.]
Id. § 1010).
51. Pre-petition claims not listed by the debtor in its schedule of liabilities filed with the
court under section 521(1) of the Code may be filed by a creditor pursuant to section 501(a)
of the Code. Such claims are deemed allowed, unless a party in interest objects. See id.
§ 502(a). Under section 502(g), "A claim arising from the rejection, under section 365 of this
title ... of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor that has not been assumed
shall be determined, and shall be allowed ... or disallowed . . . the same as if such claim had
arisen before the date of the filing of the petition." Allowed claims obtain the priority in
distribution specified in section 507 of the Code. Damages suffered by the OP as a result
of the rejection of a lease or executory contract are afforded the same treatment. See
generally Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 531 (1984) ("Damages on the contract that result from the
rejection of an executory contract, as noted, must be administered through bankruptcy and
receive the priority provided general unsecured creditors.")
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After the claim is satisfied (either through distribution of
property of the estate pursuant to section 726 of the Code, or
pursuant to a plan of reorganization under section 1141, 1228, or
1328), the Debtor will, through the bankruptcy discharge granted
under section 727, 1141, 1228 or 1328 of the Code,52 be relieved
of its obligations under the lease or contract 53 and the NDP will
be permanently enjoined from seeking enforcement of that lease or
contract under section 524 of the Code.54 In sum, the contract
has, by operation of the Code, been rendered unenforceable against
Debtor.
But what happens to the contract or lease? Except in limited
circumstances in which Congress has chosen to provide a NDP
continuing property rights under rejected contracts or leases, 55 the
Code says nothing about the status of these rejected agreements.
Examining precisely this issue, Michael T. Andrew56 reached
the conclusion that rejection of the lease or contract does not result
in termination or cancellation thereof and does not affect the rights
of the NDP to the UP. Professor Jay Lawrence Westbrook 57 has
endorsed a similar theory, seeing rejection of executory contracts
and leases alone as having no effect on what he calls an "ITI," or
"interest in the thing itself" (in my terminology, property rights of
52. A discharge granted pursuant to section 727(a) "discharges the debtor from all debts
that arose before the date of the order for relief under this chapter, and any liability on a
claim that is determined under section 502 of this title as if such claim had arisen before the
commencement of the case ...." 11 U.S.C. § 727(a). Confirmation of a plan of reorgani-
zation under section 1141 "discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date
of such confirmation, and any debt of a kind specified in section 502(g) [describing claims
arising from rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease] ...." Id. § 1141(d)-
(1)(A). Other sections provide that a discharge "discharges the debtor from all unsecured
debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under section 502 of this title ...." Id. §§
1228(c), 1328(c). A non-individual debtor is not entitled to a discharge in Chapter 7, see id.
§ 727(a)(1), but because such a debtor is unlikely to continue to conduct business in its
current legal form after emerging from bankruptcy, the absence of a discharge in most cases
does not render pre-petition obligations enforceable as a practical matter.
53. The Bankruptcy Code lists certain claims that are not subject to discharge pursuant
to section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b) or 1328(b). See 11 U.S.C. § 523.
54. A discharge under title 11 "operates as an injunction against the commencement or
continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset
any such [discharged] debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of
such debt is waived ...." Id. § 524(a)(2).
55. See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
56. Andrew, Executory Contracts, supra note 8, at 921.
57. Westbrook, Functional Analysis, supra note 8, at 257-263.
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the NDP in the UP). 58  With due respect, I must take another
view.59 I believe their assertion that rejected leases and contracts
remain intact for some purposes after rejection and discharge is
unsupported either by the language of the Code or by bankruptcy
policy. In reaching that conclusion, I will begin by looking at
situations in which contracts become void under state law and the
consequences of that avoidance. I will then look at the language
of the Code, which indirectly supports the conclusion that a
rejected lease or contract terminates. Finally, I will argue that the
"fresh start" policy underlying the Code requires the same
conclusion.
A. Voidable Contracts at State Law
Bankruptcy is, of course, a statutory construct. However, the
common law provides analogies to which we can look to discern
the consequences of bankruptcy on a rejected lease or contract. By
operation of the Code, a contract or lease that was initially
enforceable against both parties has become unenforceable against
one of those parties, that is, one party has been discharged of its
obligations on the contract or lease. The most obvious analogy
outside the bankruptcy context is the discharge of one party to a
valid contract or lease based on impossibility of performance.
The common law doctrine of excuse is far more limited than
bankruptcy discharge. Early nineteenth century contract theorists
58. The Andrew/Westbrook thesis has also convinced Professor Lawrence P. King, who
endorsed it in the most recent edition of COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY when discussing section
365. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.09[3], at 365-73 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.
rev. 1998) [hereinafter COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY]. However, in discussing section
502(b)(6), Professor King states, "The rejection of a lease under section 365 is equivalent to
a termination by breach." 4 id. 502.03[7][b], at 502-46. See generally infra notes 103-04
and accompanying text. A number of courts have also been persuaded by the An-
drew/Westbrook analysis. See supra note 9.
One court has taken the Andrew/Westbrook view to the ultimate conclusion that an
executory contract that could be specifically enforced in the absence of bankruptcy remains
specifically enforceable against a rejecting debtor because it is not "terminated." See In re
Walnut Associates, 145 B.R. 489, 494 (Bankr. E. D. Pa. 1992). One could characterize that
conclusion as rejecting rejection.
59. Of course, if the lease or contract remained in effect after rejection and discharge,
any STP with a security interest in the rights of either the Owner or the OP continues to
hold that security interest after rejection. Therefore, my ultimate conclusion that an STP
"rides through" the rejection process would be the same even if I agreed with Messrs.
Andrew and Westbrook. See, e.g., In re Austin Development Co. 19 F.3d 1077, 1084 (5th
Cir. 1994) (holding that rights of secured party in debtor/tenant's leasehold interest did not
terminate with rejection of lease).
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embraced what has been described as "a theory of absolute
contractual liability,"6 under which parties would be held to the
letter of their bargain notwithstanding subsequent "accident or
inevitable necessity." 61 Impossibility of performance theoretically
failed to supply a defense to contractual liability because the parties
had the ability from the inception of the contractual relationship to
specify the risks they were unwilling to assume and thus protect
themselves from burdensome obligations.
62
However, the practical injustice of holding parties to contractu-
al obligations in the face of extreme changes in circumstances that
the parties themselves had not foreseen (and thus had not reached
an objectively discernible meeting of the minds expressed in the
contract as to allocation of risk for non-performance in that
situation) impelled courts to develop safety valves to the absolute
liability theory. As ultimately reflected in the section 457 of the
Restatement of Contracts, "where, after the formation of a contract
facts that a promisor had no reason to anticipate, and for the
occurrence of which he is not in contributing fault, render perfor-
60. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACr 49 (2d ed. 1995).
61. Adams v. Nichols, 19 Mass. Pick. 275, 276 (1837). This nineteenth century theory
was heavily influenced by dictum from a seventeenth century English case, Paradine v. Jane,
Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897, Style 47, 82 Eng. Rep. 519 (K.B. 1647). In that case, the lessee
sought to be excused from paying rent when he was ousted from the leased premises by
royalist forces led by Prince Rupert, nephew of Charles I of England, during the English
Civil War. In refusing to discharge the lessee, according to the report in Aleyn the court
noted:
"[W]hen the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he
is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable
necessity, because he might have provided against it by his contract."
Aleyn at 27. The report of the case in Style has no such language, and it is likely that the
result in Paradine turned less on a theory of absolute contract than on the court's view of
leasehold interests. See generally GILMORE, supra note 57, at 51. It certainly did not deal
with a situation in which performance (the performance at issue in Paradine was payment
of rent) had been rendered "impossible." See generally John D. Wladis, Common Law and
Uncommon Events: The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance in
English Contract Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1575, 1585 (1987).
62. See, e.g., Wills v. Shockley, 157 A.2d 252, 253 (Del. 1960) ("At the time of entering
the contract, [salvager] did not see fit to relieve himself from liability for his failure to
perform by reason of any subsequent difficulty .... Not having done so, he is now obligated
to perform the contract according to its terms .. "); Beatty v. Oakland Sheet Metal Supply
Co., 244 P.2d 25, 33 (Cal. App. 1952) ("If a party desires to be free from his obligation to
deliver a commodity in the event of nonproduction by a particular concern, it is incumbent
upon him to make clear provision to that effect in his contract.") (quoting S. L. Jones & Co.
v. Bond, 217 P. 725, 727 (Cal. 1923)); Leavitt v. Dover, 32 A. 156, 156 (N.H. 1891) ("Having
voluntarily entered into an absolute contract, without any qualification or exception ... he
must abide by his contract ....").
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mance of the promise impossible, the duty of the promisor is
discharged."63 The doctrine, later reflected in sections 2-615 and
2A-405 of the U.C.C.6' and in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts section 261,65 embraces not only performance that is
physically impossible but also performance that may be rendered
impracticable because of "extreme and unreasonable difficulty,
expense, injury, or loss to one of the parties will be involved." 66
Two central limitations are inherent in the common law
impossibility/impracticability doctrine. First, the anticipated non-
occurrence of the supervening event must have been central to the
willingness of the parties to enter into the contract. This concept
certainly includes events that were not reasonably foreseeable by
the contracting parties. However, although traditionally phrased in
terms of "foreseeability," as recognized by Restatement (Second)
of Contracts section 261, parties may share a central expectation
that certain occurrences that may be foreseeable will not occur, and
may decline expressly to allocate risk for those occurrences for
reasons of negotiating dynamics, cost, or complexity.67
63. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 457 (1932).
64. Section 2-615 of the U.C.C. provides:
"Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation ...
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller ... is
not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has
been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence
of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance
in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or
order .... "
U.C.C. § 2-615 (1977).
The parallel provision under Article 2A for excused performance under a lease
provides:
(a) Delay in delivery or nondelivery in whole or in part by a lessor or a
supplier ... is not a default under the lease contract if performance as agreed has
been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the nonoccurrence
of which was a basic assumption on which the lease contract was made or by
compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental
regulation or order ....
Id. § 2A-405(a) (1987).
65. "Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable
without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that performance is
discharged .... "
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. d (1981); see also RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 454 (1932).
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. c ("Factors such as the
practical difficulty of reaching agreement on the myriad of conceivable terms of a complex
agreement may excuse a failure to deal with improbable contingencies."). See, e.g.,
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The second limitation on the "impossibility" doctrine at
common law was the reluctance to relieve one party of its obliga-
tions if the event were occasioned by acts or omissions of the party
seeking such relief. This limitation may have grown up from the
general notion that parties to a contract have an implied obligation
of good faith and fair dealing,68 which would be inconsistent with
affirmatively causing or failing to take steps to prevent an interven-
ing event that prevents performance. In any event, courts consis-
tently required parties seeking to benefit from the impossibility
doctrine to come into court with "clean hands" in the sense of
being the innocent victim of circumstances rather than an active
manipulator of events.69
The consequences of impossibility of performance of a contract
by one party are well-established: when the limitations of the
doctrine are satisfied, the party is "discharged, 71 from liability on
the contract. The consequences of the excused party's failure to
perform for the other party are the same as those in the case of a
breach of contract; if performance is a material term, the other
party can also decline to perform and terminate the contract. 71 If
the performance is permanently excused, the contract terminates. 72
Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
68. See U.C.C. § 1-203; see also, e.g., Taylor Equipment, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 98 F.3d
1028 (8th Cir. 1996); Jones Distributing Co., Inc. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 943
F. Supp. 1445 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc. 690 A.2d 575 (N.J.
1997).
69. See, e.g., Taylor-Edwards Warehouse & Transfer Co. v. Burlington Northern, Inc.
715 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1983) (increased expense attributable to railroad's own decision to
abandon main rail line); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283
(7th Cir. 1974) (increased expense of performance attributable to seller's decision to switch
to Canadian mine); Handicapped Children's Educ. Bd. v. Lukaszewski, 332 N.W.2d 774 (Wis.
1983) (health danger associated with performance attributable to teacher rather than school
board).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 457 (1932).
71. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 9.9, at 572 (1990);
see, e.g., Stewart & Stevenson Services, Inc. v. Superior Boatworks, Inc., Civ. A. Nos. 94-
2332, 94-2693 1995 WL 608494 (E.D. La. Oct. 11, 1995) (allowing termination of subcontract
when performance became impossible due to non-assumption of prime contract upon bank-
ruptcy of third party). When dealing with executory contracts in bankruptcy, we are by
definition necessarily discussing contracts in which the nonperformance of the remaining
obligations of one party are sufficiently material as to excuse the complete nonperformance
of the remaining obligations of the other party. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Superior Boat Works, 1995 WL 608494, at *2; RSB Manufacturing Corp.
v. Bank of Baroda, 15 B.R. 650, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Autry v. Republic Prods., 180 P.2d 888
(Cal. 1947); Village of Minneota v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 31 N.W. 2d 920 (Minn. 1948);
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To the extent that the contract conveyed property interests, "courts
attempt to return the parties to their status quo ante, unless to do
so would work an injustice on third parties."73 Thus, for example,
when consideration for the conveyance of a railroad right-of-way
could no longer legally be provided in the form previously agreed
(a lifetime pass), one court concluded that the "contract is at an
end" and "[t]he party obtaining the property ... should be
required to restore it, or to pay for it upon equitable terms.
74
But is the rejection of a lease or executory contract sufficiently
analogous to contractual impossibility to argue that the consequenc-
es of discharge in both situations should be identical? Initially, one
could argue that each party to a lease or contract certainly is able
to foresee the potential lack of continued financial viability of the
other party,75 and that the necessary pre-condition to operation of
the impossibility doctrine therefore does not exist. However, the
parties to the contract certainly share a "basic assumption" that
both parties will remain willing and able to perform the contract
during its term, within the meaning of Restatement (Second) of
Contracts section 261. Even if a party insisted on an absence of
"foreseeability" as a precondition to excuse for nonperformance, if
one views bankruptcy as analogous to death or illness of an
individual contracting party (albeit a financial rather than a physical
affliction), its occurrence should not be seen as "foreseeable" in a
way that precludes invocation of the impossibility doctrine.76
Schaub v. Wright, 130 N.E. 143 (Ind. App. 1921); Stratford, Inc. v. Seattle Brewing &
Malting Co., 162 P. 31 (Wash. 1916); cf. Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363
F.2d 312, 320 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("When performance of a contract is deemed impossible it is
a nullity.").
73. HOWARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACrS 19.01, at 19-3 (rev. ed.
1993).
74. Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Crowe, 160 S.W. 759, 760 (Ky. 1913) (ordering payment
rather than restitution of the property because "the rights of the public hav[e] intervened").
75. Indeed, parties are often sufficiently concerned about the possibility of bankruptcy
that they bargain for credit support in the form of guarantees, letters of credit, and security
interests to protect themselves from financial peradventure.
76. As explained by one author:
"Any one who contracts to render a personal service within a year knows
that death or illness may occur; but under ordinary circumstances he does not
foresee that it will occur during the year of performance and his duty is terminated
if he still could and would have performed as agreed but for the unforeseen
event."
6 CORBIN, supra note 25, § 1329, at 348.Cf. In re Martin Paint Stores, 199 B.R. 258, 265-66
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 207 B.R. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that when a debtor
tenant assumed and assigned lease to competitor of another tenant in same building, the
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Moreover, if financial collapse was viewed as "foreseeable," when
the ability to foresee potential events is not coupled with an ability
to allocate the risk of those events through contractual negotiation,
it would be meaningless to designate such events as "foreseeable."
The Code prevents the parties from specifying the consequences of
financial collapse of one or the other by contract. Instead, the
legislative provisions preclude the NDP from enforcing any
provisions of the contract against the debtor,7" in particular those
that permit termination or modification of the contract conditioned
on financial condition or insolvency of the debtor or the com-
mencement of a bankruptcy case.78
Similarly, one could argue that the Debtor has "caused" the
event that precipitated the impossibility of performance, in two
ways. First, the Debtor has pursued a course of action that had led
inexorably to its financial difficulties. But the same could be
argued of an individual whose careless or intentional acts result in
his death or disability, and courts have nevertheless suggested that
the conclusion of those acts provides an excuse to performance by
landlord excused under the impossibility doctrine from compliance with use restriction
contained in second tenant's lease because the risks associated with bankruptcy were not
contemplated or allocated by the parties).
77. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994). That section states:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commence-
ment of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
78. See id. § 365(e)(1). That section reads:
(e)(1) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease, or in
applicable law, an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor may not be terminated
or modified, and any right or obligation under such contract or lease may not be terminated
or modified, at any time after the commencement of the case solely because of a provision
in such contract or lease that is conditioned on-
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before
the closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this
title or a custodian before such commencement.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:2
reason of impossibility.79 Second, the Debtor (or the trustee on
its behalf) has taken a more direct action to preclude performance,
by electing to reject the contract and relieve itself from its liabilities
thereunder. While this is certainly true, the right of the Debtor to
make such an election is statutory in nature, and represents a
Congressional judgment that the public interest is best served by
affording troubled debtors the ability to reassess certain contractual
obligations (a "second look" policy) and to elect to return to the
pre-contractual state at the cost of providing for the damages
occasioned by that decision in connection with the bankruptcy
proceeding. Indeed, if the parties were to attempt to provide
contractually for a waiver of the Debtor's ability to reject a
contract, such a provision would undoubtedly be unenforceable as
contrary to public policy.80
This discussion is not intended to suggest that the rejection of
executory contracts and leases is simply an application of the
doctrine of impossibility of performance. Indeed, in the absence of
the legislative provisions permitting the discharge of the Debtor,
common law principles would hold the Debtor to the contract
notwithstanding the fact that the promised performance is financial-
ly difficult or even impossible.81 The two concepts also differ
79. See, e.g., Hughes v. Wamsutta Mills, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 201 (1865) (rejecting the
suggestion that an employee's arrest was due to his "voluntary act" and allowing him to
invoke the impossibility defense when unable to perform) cf. Joseph Constantine S.S. Line,
Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corp., [1942] A.C. 154, 166 ("Some day it may have to be
determined whether a prima donna is excused by complete loss of voice from an executory
contract to sing if it is proved that her condition was caused by her carelessness in not
changing her wet clothes after being out in the rain. The implied term may turn out to be
that the fact of supervening physical incapacity dissolves the contract without inquiring
further into its cause, provided, of course, that it has not been deliberately induced in order
to get out of the engagement.").
80. Cf. Farm Credit of Cent. Fla., ACA v. Polk, 160 B.R. 870 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993);
In re Sky Group Int'l, Inc., 108 B.R. 86 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (granting of waivers of
automatic stay given during prepetition workout not enforceable). For a general discussion
of bankruptcy waivers, see Marshall E. Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling
Theory, Practice, and Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 301 (1997).
81. See, e.g., Bernina Distribs. v. Bernina Sewing Mach. Co., 646 F.2d 434 (10th Cir.
1981); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974);
Huffines v. Swor Sand & Gravel, 750 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. App. 1988); 407 East 61st St. Garage
v. Savoy Fifth Ave. Corp. 244 N.E. 2d 3,417 (N.Y. 1968) ("[W]here impossibility or difficulty
of performance is occasioned only by financial difficulty, or economic hardship, even to the
extent of insolvency or bankruptcy, performance of a contract is not excused."). See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261, cmt. b ("[m]ere market shifts or
financial inability do not usually effect discharge."); cf. Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse
and Bankruptcy, 43 STAN. L. REV. 99 (1990) (analyzing the historical and philosophical
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notably in their consequences on the NDP. Whereas impossibility
of performance completely discharges the party precluded from
performance from damages for the breach of contract occasioned
by that nonperformance," rejection of a contract or lease gives
rise to a claim against the nonperforming party, explicitly recog-
nized by the Code, for damages caused by the breach. 3 Yet,
despite its differences from rejection, the impossibility doctrine
provides the most apt analogy outside of bankruptcy in which a
contract, initially enforceable against both parties, becomes
completely unenforceable against one because of subsequent
events, whether natural or legal. When a rejected contract or lease
has become unenforceable as a matter of law because of the
differences between contract excuse and bankruptcy discharge and suggesting that radically
different approaches to the two concepts are not warranted); John C. Weistart, The Costs of
Bankruptcy, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 107, 112 (1977) (suggesting that any distinction
between insolvency and other types of impossibility is not "inevitable").
82. At common law, courts have grappled with the quasi-contractual remedies of restitu-
tion and unjust enrichment to compensate the party suffering damage by virtue of an
impossibility excuse. See, e.g., Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, 538 P.2d 301 (Utah
1975); Cazares v. Saenz, 256 Cal. Rptr. 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Buccini v. Paterno Constr.
Co., 170 N.E. 910 (N.Y. 1930). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS provides that the
promisor excused from the performance must return any benefits received under the
contract. See id. § 158(1) (1981). See generally John Elofson, The Dilemma of Changed
Circumstances in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis of the Foreseeability and Superior
Risk Bearer Tests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (1996); Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Case for
Loss Sharing, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 573 (1983); Comment, Apportioning Loss After Discharge
of a Burdensome Contract: A Statutory Solution, 69 YALE L.J. 1055 (1960); Andrew Kull,
Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1
(1991); Daniel T. Ostas & Frank P. Darr, Understanding Commercial Impracticability:
Tempering Efficiency with Community Fairness Norms, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 343 (1996);
Michelle J. White, Contract Breach and Contract Discharge Due to Impossibility: A Unified
Theory, 17 J. LEG. ST. 353 (1988).
_ 83. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(g)(1), 502(g) (1994). The fact that the Bankruptcy Code
provides such a remedy has been cited by some courts as evidence that rejection of the lease
or contract does not result in its termination; if the lease or contract terminated, these courts
reason, there would be no binding obligations to breach and no claim against the Debtor (or
any guarantor of the Debtor) on account of such breach. See, e.g., In re Continental Airlines,
981 F.2d 1450, 1459 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Modern Textile, Inc., 900 F.2d 1184, 1191 (8th Cir.
1990); In re Kilpatrick, 160 B.R. 560, 563 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993); Societe Nationale
Algerienne v. Distrigas Corp., 80 B.R. 606, 608 (D. Mass. 1987). In reaching this conclusion,
courts are adhering too literally to the term "termination." Rejection should be viewed
resulting in "cancellation" of the lease or contract within the meaning of section 2-106(4) of
the U.C.C. rather than "termination" within the meaning of section 2-106(3). The effect is
the same (all obligations that are executory on both sides are discharged), but upon
"cancellation" the cancelling party "retains any remedy for breach of the whole contract or
any unperformed balance." Id. § 2-106(4); see In re Child World, Inc., 147 B.R. 847, 852
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[R]ejection of the ... contracts does not mean that the obligations
thereunder will evaporate. Rejection is not the equivalent of rescission .... ").
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operation of the provisions of the Code, it must be found to come
to an end as does any other contract rendered completely impossi-
ble of performance, and thus unenforceable, by superseding event.
Another analogy one might make to state contract law would
be to the contract that is voidable by reason of minority. Now
codified in most states, 84 at common law a contract entered into
by a minor is voidable (subject to "disaffirmance") at the instance
of the minor at any time prior to a reasonable period after the
minor attains majority." Alternatively, the minor can "ratify" the
contract upon reaching the age of majority, thereby affirmatively
relinquishing the right to disaffirm. Although the Code uses the
term "rejection" instead of "disaffirmance," and "assumption"
instead of "ratification," the decision given the trustee in bankrupt-
cy is very much the same. As under section 365 of the Code, the
contract must be disaffirmed or ratified in whole; minors cannot
select which provisions are binding.8 6 The consequence of the
doctrine is to "allow the minor to enforce transactions that have
proved advantageous while avoiding those that have proved
disadvantageous, 87 which is precisely the objective behind the
power to assume or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases
given a trustee under section 365 of the Code.
Unlike under the Code, the power of a minor to disaffirm
applies even to fully performed contracts, including those in which
goods or real property were sold to or by the minor. Upon
disaffirmance, "the transaction is treated for many purposes as if it
were void from the beginning."88  The minor returns anything
received under the contract (traditionally without responsibility for
any damage or depreciation), and the other contractual party also
returns what it received, whether cash or property. In the case of
real property, the obligation to return applies even if the other
party has sold what was received from the minor to a bona fide
84. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-102 (1993); LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1918 (West 1995);
MISSOURI ANN. STAT. § 475.345 (West 1993).
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981); JOHN D. CALAMARI &
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS, § 8-2 (3d ed. 1987); FARNSWORTH, supra note 71, § 4.4.
86. See, e.g., Putman v. Deinhamer, 70 N.W.2d 652, 655-56 (Wis. 1955) (holding that a
minor may not repudiate cancellation provisions of automobile insurance policy while
retaining remainder of policy).
87. FARNSWORTH, supra note 71, § 4.4, at 380.
88. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 85, § 8-2, at 308.
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purchaser for value. 9 The common law rule is thus to return to
the "status quo ante regardless of the effect on the other party."90
The harsh effect of the common law rule has been ameliorated
in the case of contracts for "necessaries," 9' and in some jurisdic-
tions (notably New Hampshire) in other situations as well,92 by
providing the other party a claim against the minor for the value of
what the minor received and did not return. But in all situations
the contract is terminated and becomes void, even if the other
party is given an extra-contractual remedy.
A bankrupt is not a minor, of course, and the doctrine
embodied in section 365 of the Code is not premised on any notion
of incapacity to contract. However, in both situations the law
recognizes the ability of a contractual party to take a "second look"
at its obligations under its contracts and decide whether it will
continue to honor them. Although the drafters of the Code have
chosen to provide the OP a remedy for rejection not generally
available to those dealing with minors, there is no reason that the
effect of that choice to disaffirm or reject on the contract itself and
property rights received thereunder should be any different in the
two contexts; the rejected contract, like one subject to disaffir-
mance, is terminated and void.
B. Interpreting the Code
Although statutory support for this conclusion is indirect, some
provisions of the Code suggest that Congress recognized that
rejected leases and contracts ceased to exist. First, in special
circumstances, Congress has chosen to ameliorate the effects of
termination of rejected leases or executory contracts in the interest
of preserving property rights of the NDP In the case of an
unexpired lease of real property under which the Debtor is the
lessor, Congress provided in section 365 that a lessee who does not
89. See Ware v. Mobley, 9 S.E.2d 67 (Ga. 1940) (citing cases). With respect to personal
property, section 2-403(1) of the U.C.C. modifies this rule and grants protection to the good
faith purchaser for value. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 85, § 8-2, at 308.
90. HUNTER, supra note 73, 2.01[4], at 2-7.
91. FARNSWORTH, supra note 82, § 4.5, at 385; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 85,
§ 8-8.
92. See Bartlett v. Bailey, 59 N.H. 408 (1879); see also Valencia v. White, 654 P.2d 287,
292 (Ariz. 1982); Kelly v. Furlong, 261 N.W. 460, 462 (Minn. 1935); Porter v. Wilson, 209
A.2d 730, 732 (N.H. 1965); Pankas v. Bell, 198 A.2d 312, 315 (Pa. 1964).
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wish to treat the rejection as terminating the lease93 may retain
the right to remain in possession of the leased property, notwith-
standing the rejection of the lease.94 Congress expanded those
93. Section 365(h)(1)(A)(i) states:
If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property under which the debtor
is the lessor and-
(i) if the rejection by the trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle
the lessee to treat such lease as terminated by virtue of its terms, applicable
nonbankruptcy law, or any agreement made by the lessee, then the lessee under
such lease may treat such lease as terminated by the rejection ....
In In re Austin Development Co., 19 F.3d 1077, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 874
(1994), the court relied on the existence of section 365(h)(1)(A)(i), and the comparable
provisions in sections 365(i) and 365(n) dealing with timeshare interests and licenses of
intellectual property, to support its conclusion that Congress did not make rejection of a
lease or contract result in termination thereof under other circumstances. See id. at 1082-83.
I agree with the Fifth Circuit in its conclusion that Congress did not attempt to provide for
termination of rejected leases and executory contracts as a matter of federal law. However,
I believe that under state law-to which Congress properly deferred on matters of property
rights-a lease or contract that becomes totally unenforceable against one of the parties must
terminate. The inclusion of the "savings" provisions in sections 365(h), 365(i), and 365(n)
were therefore intended not to give the OP an "option to terminate," as the Fifth Circuit
characterizes it. See id. at 1083. Indeed, the legislative history of section 365(n)(1)
recognizes that the ability of the OP to treat a rejected license as terminated "would be
available to the licensee without this bill." S. REP. No. 100-505, at XX (19XX), reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3201. Rather, these provisions were included by Congress to
provide the OP an option it would not have under state law, an option to retain its rights
under the lease, timeshare plan, or license agreement notwithstanding its rejection. In
essence, the provisions of the Code in these three situations preempt state law and allow OPs
to elect to keep in effect leases and executory contracts that would otherwise automatically
terminate under state law. Cf. In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc., 23 B.R. 104, 118 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that a lessee under an equipment lease is not protected by section
365(h), and that the equipment returns to lessor upon rejection of lease).
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii). As originally enacted, section 365(h)(1) read as
follows:
(h)(1) If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property of the debtor
under which the debtor is the lessor, the lessee under such lease may treat the
lease as terminated by such rejection, or, in the alternative, may remain in
possession for the balance of the term of such lease and any renewal or extension
of such term that is enforceable by such lessee under applicable nonbankruptcy
law.
This provision was consistent with section 70b of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See Act
of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended, 11 U.S.C. § ll0b (repealed, Section 401 of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, P.L. No. 95-598) Section 706 provided in part as
follows:
Unless a lease of real property shall expressly otherwise provide, a rejection of
such lease or any covenant therein by the trustee of the lessor shall not deprive
the lessee of his estate.
It has been suggested that the language of section 70b protecting lessees from the
consequences of lease rejection by a landlord was merely a reflection of the common law
principle that a landlord's creation of a leasehold estate in the lessee was an executed
conveyance of a property interest and was not itself subject to rejection. See John J.
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protections in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,9' preserving
in the NDP/Lessee after rejection by the Debtor/lessor other rights
under the lease that are "in or appurtenant to the real property" to
the extent enforceable under nonbankruptcy law.96
Creedon & Robert M. Zinman, Landlord's Bankruptcy: Laissez Les Lessees, 26 Bus. LAW.
1391, 1404-05 (1971) (arguing that a bankrupt landlord's right to receive rent for leased
premises is not subject to rejection as executory). However, section 70b, like section 365(a)
of the Code, did not provide for rejection of "executory provisions" of an executory contract
or unexpired lease; it provided for assumption or rejection of the contract or lease as a
whole. Courts have recognized, both under the Bankruptcy Act and under the Code, that
a debtor cannot pick and choose those provisions of an executory contract or lease it wishes
to reject. See, e.g., In re Mr. Gatti's, Inc., 162 B.R. 1004, 1011 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994); In
re TSW Stores of Nanuet, 34 B.R. 299, 304 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Italian Cook Oil
Corp., 190 F.2d 994 (3d Cir. 1951); Grief Bros. Cooperage Co. v. Mullinex, 264 F.391 (8th
Cir. 1920). The language in the savings clause of section 70b, quoted above, seems to suggest
that the drafters of section 70b contemplated rejection of selected covenants in executory
contracts or leases; however, if this was the intent of the drafters, it was not reflected in the
operative language of section 70b, which refers to rejection or assumption of "an executory
contract, including an unexpired lease of real property." The language of section 365 of the
Code includes no suggestion that specific covenants in an executory contract or unexpired
lease may be rejected. If rejection did not have the consequence of terminating the lessee's
estate in property, there would have been no need for the "savings" clause at all.
Indeed, those cases protecting the property interest of an NDP/Lessee upon rejection
of a lease of real property have invariably done so by applying the specific statutory savings
provision rather than by invoking any common law principle. See, e.g., In re Minges, 602
F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Garfinkle, 577 F.2d 901, 904 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978); In re New
York Investors Mutual Group, 153 F. Supp. 772, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff d sub nor. Cohen
v. East Netherland Holding Co., 258 F.2d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1958); In re Chestnut Ridge Plaza
Associates, L.P., 156 B.R. 477, 481 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993); In re Lee Road Partners, Ltd.,
155 B.R. 55 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 169 B.R. 507 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Wood Comm
Fund I, Inc., 116 B.R. 817, 818 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990); In re LHD Realty Corp., 20 B.R.
717, 719 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982); cf. In re Kong, 162 B.R. 86, 94-97 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(refusing to approve rejection of lease by debtor/lessor because estate would not benefit from
rejection as a result of right of lessee to remain in possession under section 365(h)); In re
Arden & Howe Associates, Ltd., 152 B.R. 971, 977 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1993) (concluding that
restrictive use covenant in lease was not enforceable by lessee after rejection under section
365(h)).
95. Pub. L. No. 103-394 (effective Oct. 22, 1994).
96. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii). That section reads:
(h)(1)(A) If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property under
which the debtor is the lessor and-
(ii) if the term of such lease has commenced, the lessee may retain its rights
under such lease (including rights such as those relating to the amount and timing
of payment of rent and other amounts payable by the lessee and any right of use,
possession, quiet enjoyment, subletting, assignment, or hypothecation) that are in
or appurtenant to the real property for the balance of the term of such lease and
for any renewal or extension of such rights to the extent that such rights are
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
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The same treatment is afforded purchasers of timeshare
interests from a Debtor/Seller,97 as well as purchasers of real
property from a Debtor/Owner who rejects the sale contract as
executory.98 Similarly, on the theory that, as is true for real
property leases and timeshare interests, the property underlying an
intellectual property license is "unique,"99 Congress adopted a new
section 365(n) that allows a NDP licensee of intellectual property
to retain use of the intellectual property covered by the license and
exercise its rights thereunder to exclusive use, notwithstanding the
rejection of the license by the trustee."°
These provisions of the Code are specifically limited to the
types of leases or executory contracts described therein, and could
be seen as carefully tailored legislative reactions to interpretations
of the Code that adversely affected important segments of the
economy. Nevertheless, had the operation of section 365 of the
The purpose of the amendment was to reject those cases that had narrowly interpreted the
term "possession" in the prior version of section 365(h)(1), see supra note 94 and to allow
a lessee under a rejected lease to retain such rights under the lease as "the amount and
timing of payment of rent or other amounts payable by the lessee, the right to use, possess,
quiet enjoyment, sublet, or assign." 140 CONG. REC. H10,752-01, H10,767 (daily ed. Oct. 4,
1994).
97. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(2)(A)(ii). Under section 365(h)(2)(A)(ii), if the purchaser
does not wish to treat the timeshare plan as terminated, the purchaser may "retain its rights
in such timeshare interest for the balance of such term and for any term of renewal or
extension of such timeshare interest to the extent that such rights are enforceable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law."
98. Section 365(i)(1) provides:
If the trustee rejects an executory contract of the debtor for the sale of real
property or for the sale of a timeshare interest under a timeshare plan, under
which the purchaser is in possession, such purchaser may treat such contract as
terminated, or, in the alternative, may remain in possession of such real property
or timeshare interest.
99. S. Rep. No. 100-505, at 4 (19XX), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3203.
100. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1). That section provides:
(n)(1) If the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the debtor
is a licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licensee under such contract
may elect-
(A) to treat such contract as terminated by such rejection if such rejec-
tion by the trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle the licensee to
treat such contract as terminated by virtue of its own terms, applicable non-
bankruptcy law, or an agreement made by the licensee with another entity;
or
(B) to retain its rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity
provision of such contract, but excluding any other right under applicable
nonbankruptcy law to specific performance of such contract) under such
contract and under any agreement supplementary to such contract, to such
intellectual property ....
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Code not resulted in the termination of the rejected contract or
lease in these contexts, there would have been no need for
palliative measures.
When it is the trustee for a lessee under a lease of nonresiden-
tial real property who is deemed to have rejected a lease by failure
to assume or reject it within 60 days after the date of the order for
relief, section 365(d)(4) of the Code directs the trustee to "immedi-
ately surrender such nonresidential real property to the lessor." If
the rejected lease remained effective, surrender to the lessor would
be inappropriate, as noted by several of the courts that have
concluded that this type of rejection results in termination of a
lease.'01 There is no reason to believe that rejection of other
types of unexpired leases or executory contracts have a different
legal consequence.
Additional support can be drawn from the language of section
502 dealing with allowance of claims. Although claims resulting
from the deemed breach of a rejected contract or lease are
generally not described specifically, certain types of such claims are
treated in detail and are described in terms that support the
conclusions that the contract has terminated. In section 502(b)(6),
the Code imposes an upward limit (a "cap") on the claim that can
be asserted against a Debtor/lessee by an OP/lessor for damages
"resulting from the termination of a lease of real property.' 1' 2
The "termination" to which section 502(b)(6) refers includes the
termination resulting from rejection of a lease.1"3
101. See, e.g., Sea Harvest Corp. v. Riviera Land Co., 868 F.2d 1077, 1080-81 (9th Cir.
1989); In re 6177 Realty Associates, Inc., 142 B.R. 1017, 1019 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992); In re
Giles Associates, Ltd., 92 B.R. 695, 698 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988); In re Southwest Aircraft
Services Inc., 53 B.R. 805, 810 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 831 F.2d 848
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1206 (1988).
102. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6). That section provides that a "claim of a lessor for
damages resulting from the termination of a lease of real property" is to be disallowed to the
extent that it exceeds:
(A) the rent reserved by such lease, without acceleration, for the greater of
one year, or 15 percent, not to exceed three years, of the remaining term of such
lease, following the earlier of-
(i) the date of the filing of the petition; and
(ii) the date on which such lessor repossessed, or the lessee surren-
dered, the leased property; plus
(B) any unpaid rent due under such lease, without acceleration, on the
earlier of such dates ....
103. See id. Section 502(b)(6) was originally enacted as Section 502(b)(7) as part of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, and was redesignated by the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 98-353. However,
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The same terminology is used in section 502(b)(7) with respect
to employment contracts; any claim "resulting from the termina-
tion" of such a contract, which includes terminations resulting from
rejection of the contract as executory,"° is statutorily limited. 1 5
it derives from long-standing provisions in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, in
particular section 63a(9), which specified, as a provable debt which could be allowed against
the bankrupt estate:
(9) claims for anticipatory breach of contracts, executory in whole or in part,
including unexpired leases of real or personal property: Provided, however, that
the claim of a landlord for damages or injury resulting from the rejection of an
unexpired lease of real estate or for damages or indemnity under a covenant
contained in such lease shall in no event be allowed in an amount exceeding [the
prescribed amount].
Similar caps on the damage claim allowable to a landlord in the case of rejection of an
unexpired lease were included in sections 202, 353 and 458 of the Act for cases under
chapters X, XI and XII. The justification for such provisions was the recognition that the
claim of a landlord under a rejected lease could be disproportionate to the damage actually
suffered by the landlord, and could deplete the estate. See generally Oldden v. Tonto Realty
Corp., 143 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1944); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 58,
502.03[7][a], at 502-45.
Although it has been successfully argued that the different language in section
502(b)(6) (referring to damages from "termination" of a lease rather than from "rejection")
indicated that the statutory cap does not apply to damages caused by breach of lease
covenants as opposed to failure to continue to occupy and pay rent for the leasehold, see,
e.g., In re Bob's Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 143 B.R. 229, 231 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1992); In re Atlantic
Container Corp., 133 B.R. 980 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991), most courts have concluded that
section 502(b)(6), like its predecessor section 63a(9), is intended to capture all claims
occasioned by rejection. See In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. 91, 101 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995); In
re Mr. Gatti's, Inc., 162 B.R. 1004, 1013 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994); In re Emple Knitting Mills,
Inc., 123 B.R. 688, 691 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991).
Those cases applying the limitation imposed by section 502(b)(6) almost invariably
involve rejection of a lease under section 365. See, e.g., In re Conston Corp., 130 B.R. 449
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991); In re Communicall Central, Inc., 106 B.R. 540 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1989); Bel-Ken Associates L.P. v. Clark, 83 B.R. 357 (D. Md. 1988); In re Storage
Technology Corp., 77 B.R. 824 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986); In re Kors, Inc., 22 B.R. 19 (Bankr.
D. Vt. 1982); cf. In re Klein Sleep Products, Inc., 78 F.3d 18, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding
that section 502(b)(6) does not cap administrative claim arising from rejection of lease
previously assumed). See generally 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 58,
502.03[7][b], at 502-46 ("The rejection of a lease under section 365 is equivalent to a
termination by breach.").
104. See, e.g., In re Wilson Foods Corp., 182 B.R. 278 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995); In re
Hooker Investments, Inc., 145 B.R. 138 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 687, 713 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Uly-Pak, Inc., 128 B.R.
763 (Bankr. S.D. Il. 1991); cf., e.g., Anthony v. Interform Corp., 96 F.3d 692, 697 (3d Cir.
1996); In re Networks Electronic Corp., 195 B.R. 92, 97 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996); In re Lavelle
Aircraft Co., Bankruptcy No. 94-17 496DWS, 1996 WL 226852, at *6 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
May 2, 1996); Levinson v. LHI Holdings, Inc., 176 B.R. 255, 259 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (holding
that section 502(b)(7) applies to all employment termination claims, including those reduced
to judgment pre-petition).
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The natural conclusion to be drawn from Congressional
amendments protecting a NDP in certain discrete situations, and
the use of language limiting claims for "termination" of leases or
executory contracts that are applicable when such leases or
contracts are rejected pursuant to section 365, is that rejection
ordinarily results in termination of the rejected contract or lease.
A NDP who is a party to a lease or executory contract not
addressed by the protective provisions of section 365(h) or (n) has
no such benefit, and its right to possess or use property of the
estate or enjoy services provided by the Debtor terminate absolute-
ly when the lease or contract is rejected.
Although they seldom provide any discussion of the issue, the
overwhelming majority of cases dealing with rejected leases and
contracts not subject to the specific statutory protections just
discussed treat such contracts as terminated or cancelled. 10 6 The
Supreme Court, in its most recent decision addressing section 365
provided oblique support for this conclusion."7 The majority
concluded that "from the filing of a petition in bankruptcy until
formal acceptance [i.e., assumption], the collective-bargaining
105. See 11 U.S.C. § Section 502(b)(7). Section 502(b)(7) of the Code disallows claims
"of an employee for damages resulting from the termination of an employment contract"
exceeding the specified amount, generally one year's pay. Id. This section "tracks the
landlord limitations on damages provision in paragraph [6]." H. Rep. No. 95-595, at 354
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6310.
106. See supra note 7. One class of cases that comes to the contrary conclusion deal with
non-compete clauses. See, e.g., In re Printronics, Inc. 189 B.R. 995, 100 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
1995) (holding that the rejection by a franchisee of a franchise agreement did not terminate
obligations under agreement, including non-compete clause); In re Hirschhorn, 156 B.R. 379,
388 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that the rejection of sublease did not render a
noncompete clause unenforceable); In re Udell, 149 B.R. 908,911-913 (N.D. Ind. 1993), rev'd
on other grounds, 18 F.3d 403 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the rejection of an employment
agreement did not terminate a non-compete clause); In re Don & Lin Trucking Co., 110 B.R.
562, 567 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1990) (rejection terminates all mutual performance obligations
but does not affect provisions dealing with effect of termination). But see In re Register, 95
B.R. 73, 74 (Bankr.), affd, 100 B.R. 360 (M.D. Tenn. 1989); In re Rovine Corp., 6 B.R. 661,
666 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980) (holding that because the noncompete covenant was part of
rejected executory contract it was rejected).
Because leases or executory contracts that include such clauses contemplate that the
clauses will be operational only upon termination of the lease or contract, the conclusion that
the non-compete clause is enforceable after rejection of the lease or contract is not in itself
inconsistent with the proposition that the underlying lease or contract is terminated by
rejection. As Professor Westbrook suggested, "[Tihe right to discharge is the correct place
to tussle over [the issue of enforceability of a non-compete clause after rejection of a
contract], rather than it being the offshoot of some special rule about bankruptcy contracts."
Westbrook, supra note 8, at 277-78.
107. See NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
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agreement is not an enforceable contract within the meaning of
NLRA § 8(d)."' 8  Although four Justices dissented from this
conclusion, contending that the collective-bargaining agreement
remained "in effect" within the meaning of section 8(d) notwith-
standing the filing of a bankruptcy petition, even they assumed that
the beleaguered employer could make section 8(d) inapplicable by
rejecting the collective-bargaining contract. 9  The necessary
premise for this conclusion is that a rejected collective-bargaining
contract is no longer "in effect," that is, it has ceased to exist.
C. Termination and Property Rights
The Code explicitly discharges the Debtor under the rejected
lease or executory contract, and by analogy to the common law
contract theories previously discussed, the impact of that rejection
and discharge should be the termination of the contract. But as
previously discussed, the central feature of a contract or lease for
bankruptcy purposes is its impact on property rights of both Debtor
and OP. How does termination of the lease or executory contract
affect those property rights?
As we saw, the property interests of the Debtor created by the
lease or contract and, in the case of an Owner/Debtor, in the UP,
became property of the estate pursuant to section 541 of the
Code.1 1 When the contract or lease is rejected and thus termi-
nated, two different property rights are affected. Those property
rights that are created by the contract or lease (accounts, general
intangibles, leasehold interests) exist in the holders thereof only by
virtue of the contract or lease, and disappear with its termina-
tion.' The Owner's property rights in the UP, which existed
108. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 532 (finding section 8(d) of the NLRA inapplicable to a
collective bargaining agreement even prior to rejection).
109. See id. at 551. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
111. Certain commentators argue that property interests created by leases or contracts
continue to exist independent of rejection of those leases or contracts because the contract
is not terminated, but merely "breached." See articles cited supra note 8. As previously
discussed, I believe that common law principles of contract jurisprudence lead to the
conclusion that the rejected contract or lease must terminate when it becomes permanently
unenforceable against the Debtor. Although the plight of the innocent NDP/OP afflicted by
the Debtor/Owner's bankruptcy is certainly appealing, if one responds by preserving the OP's
property interests in the UP in this case, does one also allow a Debtor/OP to reject a lease
or contract while still obtaining the benefit of property rights in a NDP/Owner's UP created
thereby? Cf. Fletcher v. Surprise (In re Northern Indiana Oil Co.), 180 F.2d 669, 676 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 824 (1950) (rejecting the contention that the "savings clause" of
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prior to the contract or lease but were limited by its provisions
(through the creation of interests in the OP, labelled P1 in the
models), continue to exist after the termination of the lease or
contract, free of the now-unenforceable limitations. Viewed
another way, the property interests of the OP in the UP, created by
the executory contract or lease (P1), revest in the Owner upon
rejection; there, joined to the retained property interest of the
Owner in the UP, they create an unencumbered fee simple absolute
ownership. When the Owner is the Debtor, this expanded interest
in the UP acquired from the OP/NDP after the commencement of
the bankruptcy case becomes property of the estate under section
541(a)(7). When the OP is the Debtor, the effect of rejection is to
remove from the bankruptcy estate and transfer to the Owner/NDP
any property interest created by the rejected contract or lease.
The Code specifies the impact of the conclusion of a bankrupt-
cy case on property of the estate. Property of the estate is either
distributed to creditors in liquidation, u1 2 or vests in the Debtor
upon confirmation of a plan of reorganization."3 Whether in the
hands of the Debtor or a third party, such property is "free and
clear" of any claim or interest of any creditor,'1 4 and the NDP
will be permanently enjoined from seeking redress for its claim
against the property."5
If the OP is the Debtor, there is no property of the estate
relating to the rejected contract or lease existing at the conclusion
of the case because rejection resulted in the transfer of the subset
of property interests in the UP created by the lease or contract
back to the Owner/NDP If the Owner is the Debtor, however, the
entire interest in the UP, including that portion of the interest
representing the property interest of the OP/NDP that transferred
back to the Owner upon rejection, is included in the estate. Given
the broad definition of "claim" in section 101(5) of the Code, one
must conclude that the property rights of the OP/NDP under the
section 70b of the Bankruptcy Act protects a debtor/lessee from loss of the leasehold estate
upon its own rejection of the lease). The essence of rejection is that the Debtor must forego
the benefits of a contract or lease as the price of obtaining discharge from claims in respect
of the contract or lease. The mirror image of that principle is that the NDP cannot enjoy
the benefits of a contract or lease when, by virtue of rejection, the Debtor has chosen to be
relieved of the obligation to provide them.
112. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1994).
113. See id. §§ 1141(b), 1227(b), 1327(b).
114. See id. §§ 1141(c), 1227(c), 1327(c).
115. See id. § 524(a)(2).
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rejected lease or contract are precisely the types of "claims" of
which the UP in the hands of the Debtor or a third party is "free
and clear."1'
1 6
Professor Westbrook maintains that, while rejection terminates
rights and obligations under the rejected contract or lease, it does
not affect the Other Party's "Interest in the Thing Itself." He
views this as a consequence of the "property principle" under
which "bankruptcy will enforce nonbankruptcy remedies on behalf
of an Other Party if they are remedies entitling the Other Party to
dominion over a specific asset, unless the Other Party's interest is
subject to avoidance under the bankruptcy avoiding powers."'" 7
To illustrate this principle he points to the Code's respect of
security interests and argues that the same principle operates with
respect to bankruptcy contracts.1 8 Thus, rejection therefore does
not affect the Other Party's ITI.
The fallacy of this analogy is that a security interest is created
and exists as a matter of state law by reason of a security agree-
ment that is not an executory contract and thus is not subject to
assumption or rejection under federal bankruptcy law. Because the
security agreement remains valid in bankruptcy, it is quite obvious
that the rights of the secured party in the underlying collateral
created by that agreement are also respected by the Code. The
property rights (ITIs, in Westbrook's terminology) held by Other
Parties to rejected executory contracts and leases are created by,
and exist as valid rights only pursuant to, the very contract or lease
that is being rejected. When the contract or lease becomes
unenforceable as a matter of bankruptcy law, there is no indepen-
dent basis for asserting that the Other Party has a property right at
all. In that sense, section 365 does create an "avoiding power"-it
allows a debtor to render unenforceable against the estate and
ultimately against the debtor a document by which an interest in
property is conveyed to another, thus making the conveyance (and
every other provision of that document) unenforceable and (as I
have argued) void.
116. Cf. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 58, 1 365.03, at 365-30 - 31 (distinguish-
ing the situation in which an executory contract is neither rejected nor assumed during the
bankruptcy case, noting that "[tihe discharge of Section 1141(c) will not assist the debtor
since, absent rejection, the other party to the contract will not be a creditor.").
117. Westbrook, supra note 8, at 257 (footnote omitted).
118. Id. at XXX.
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D. Bankruptcy Policy
The conclusion that leases and executory contracts terminate
upon rejection and discharge, and that any property rights created
by those rejected agreements also terminate and are transformed
into "claims," is also compelling as a matter of bankruptcy policy.
A review of certain agreed upon premises of the goals of a federal
bankruptcy system leads to a better understanding of this conclu-
sion. Outside of bankruptcy, state law enables individual creditors
to strike advantageous deals with the debtor and, in the event of
default, enforce them through self-help or legal proceedings to the
detriment of the debtor's other creditors, and even in circumstances
in which honoring the obligation means financial ruin to the debtor.
The bankruptcy system alters state law both substantively and
remedially. As a substantive matter, for example, bankruptcy law
establishes that certain obligations undertaken by the debtor will
not be enforceable at all."9 Some creditors are provided recom-
pense who would not be entitled to anything outside of bankruptcy,
either because the debtor's obligations are contingent or because
they are not yet quantifiable.12 On the remedy side, the Code
stays all traditional methods of enforcing private obligations 1 '
and funnels claims into an unified forum. The claimant is then
limited to a single remedy-the assertion of a "claim," representing
a right to payment, even when state law would provide other
alternatives, such as specific performance. The Code also provides
its own priority scheme that in many respects differs from that
prevailing under state law.12
2
Various provisions in the Code can be explained as intended
to further certain policy objectives.123  For example, certain
119. Ipso facto clauses and no-assignment clauses are good examples of agreements
rendered unenforceable by bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(b)(2), 365(c)(1).
120. See id. § 101(5). Section 101(5) includes within the definition of "claim" obligations
that are "unliquidated," "contingent," "unmatured," and "disputed".
121. See id. § 362.
122. See id. § 507 (setting forth certain "priority" claims and expenses).
123. See generally, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect
World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 350-73 (1993); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 775, 790-793 (1987). In so stating, I do not intend to interject any new views
on the philosophical debate between those who believe bankruptcy should be aimed at
facilitating the enforcement of creditor entitlements, or should instead balance creditor inter-
ests against other social policies. Compare JACKSON, supra note 19; DOUGLAS G. BAIRD
& THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY (1985);
Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127
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priorities and exceptions from discharge can be seen as motivated
by Congressional concern for creditors who are least able to bear
the loss on their claim against the debtor. Therefore, their claims
are satisfied early in the distributive order, and/or are not dis-
charged at all through the bankruptcy process.124  The avoiding
powers of sections 547 and 548 can be seen as intended to further
two goals: (1) discouraging antisocial behavior towards a financial-
ly troubled debtor, and (2) requiring that similarly-situated
creditors should be treated the same, the so-called equality
principle. The bankruptcy discharge and permanent injunction are
intended to ensure that an individual or reorganized entity will
have a "fresh start," free from pre-bankruptcy claims against future
property and income.
125
How do we interpret section 365 of the Code in this light? I
agree with Professor Westbrook that, except to the extent that
there is an overriding bankruptcy policy such as those described
above mandating a different conclusion, the Code should be
interpreted to effectuate state law rules and remedies. However,
as applied to section 365, I must differ with him on the proper
analogies to be drawn from state law. This is understandable
because, as Professor Westbrook acknowledges, "[T]he state law
questions are sometimes quite difficult because some circumstances
that arise in bankruptcy are not likely to have arisen under state
law, and therefore there may be few precedents.' '126
Take as an example the simple contract for the purchase of
onions used by Professor Westbrook for illustrative purposes in his
article. 27 If the Debtor is the seller of the onions and has failed
to perform, regardless of whether the Other Party has made
(1986) with ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS (3d ed. 1996). Whether particular
provisions of the Code are justifiable in light of one's views of the purposes behind a federal
bankruptcy scheme, the policies furthered by certain of those provisions seem clear.
124. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(3) - (4) (giving preferential treatment to certain employee
claims), 507(a)(6) (giving preferential treatment to certain consumer debts) 507(a)(7) (giving
preferential treatment to claims for alimony, maintenance and support), 523(a)(5) (excluding
alimony, maintenance, and support debts from discharge).
125. See id. §§ 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1328(b) (dealing with discharge), 524(a)(2) (permanent
injunction).
126. Westbrook, supra note 8, at 285 n. 248. Although his comments were made in the
context of arguing against any requirement of "executoriness" as a condition for assumption
or rejection of contracts in bankruptcy, they are equally apt in considering the impact of
rejection on such a contract.
127. See id. at 247-48.
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payment, outside of bankruptcy the Other Party afflicted by the
breach has the option of suing for damages or seeking specific
performance of the contract. If the onions are unique in nature, a
court may order specific performance; otherwise, the Other Party
is relegated to a damage remedy.'28 Once the Other Party has
received a judgment entitling it to damages in lieu of performance,
it can no longer enforce the contract against the Debtor and the
contract terminates, having been transformed by virtue of the
judgment into money damages. If the Other Party instead obtains
specific performance, the court has determined that the contract
will be enforced against the Debtor and thus remains in effect as
a consequence of that judicial determination.
Now suppose the contract at issue is one that creates property
rights in the Other Party, such as in the Lease Model. If the
Debtor is the Lessor and has failed to perform some aspect of the
lease prior to delivery of the leased property, the analysis is exactly
the same as for the onion contract. The Other Party/Lessee may
seek money damages for breach, and if they are awarded the lease
becomes a nullity. Alternatively, the Lessee/Other Party may seek
specific performance of the lease, including delivery of the
underlying property, in which case the lease remains effective and
enforceable against the Lessor/Debtor.
If the breach of the lease occurs after the underlying property
has been delivered, the analysis is slightly different. The Other
Party/Lessee is not required by state law to make an "either/or"
choice between treating the lease as terminated and seeking
damages or alternatively trying to hold the lessor to the lease.
128. Section 2-716(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code states that "[s]pecific
performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or in other proper circumstances."
See, also e.g., Fast v. Southern Offshore Yachts, 587 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Conn. 1984)
(customized yacht); Wooster Republican Printing Co. v. Channel 17, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 601
(W.D. Mo. 1981), aff'd, 682 F.2d 165 (8th Cir. 1982) (UHF television station); Capaldi v.
Levy, 81 Cal. Rptr. 629, 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (stock of real estate development firm);
Ruddock v. First Nat'l Bk. of Lake Forest, 559 N.E.2d 483 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (astronomical
clock); Cumbest v. Harris, 363 So.2d 294 (Miss. 1978) (stereo system); Stephan's Mach. &
Tool, Inc. v. D & H Machinery Consultants, Inc., 417 N.E.2d 579 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979)
(machinery); Harris v. Barcroft, 543 P.2d 656 (Or. 1975) (show dog); Madariaga v. Morris,
639 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (business that manufactured and sold Mexican hot
sauce); cf. Vagabond Travel & Tours, Inc. v. Universal Inns of America, Inc., 440 So.2d 482,
483 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (hotel rooms are not unique); Beckman v. Vassall-Dillworth
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 440, 468 A.2d 784, 790 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (automobile is not
unique). See generally Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Specific Performance of Sale of Goods
Under UCC § 2-716, 26 A.L.R.4th 294 (1997); 81 C.J.S. Specific Performance § 82 (1977).
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Instead, the Other Party may keep the property (enforcing the
lease to that extent) and still seek monetary compensation for the
other damages caused by breach. Alternatively, the Other Party
may seek to enforce the unperformed obligations through specific
performance.
How does bankruptcy change this analysis? In bankruptcy, as
Professor Westbrook points out, the principle that requires similarly
situated creditors to be treated in a similar fashion (the equality
principle) precludes the Other Party from seeking specific perfor-
mance of a rejected (and thus "breached") contract or lease,
because specific performance is the equivalent of receiving 100
cents on the dollar of claim.129 The only remedy available to the
purchaser of onions or Lessee in the examples above is to assert a
claim for damages.
But what about the Lessee who has already received the leased
property? At state law, the Lessee may retain the property while
seeking compensatory damages. But bankruptcy policy relegates
the Lessee to a single remedy-asserting a claim for deemed
breach. To allow the Lessee to retain the property would be the
equivalent of bifurcating the lease for purposes of rejection into the
portion that was already performed (delivery of the leased
property) and the portion that is truly executory (the obligations
that have been breached) and limiting rejection to the latter.
Perhaps that would be a good idea. Indeed, Westbrook believes
that when "certain aspects of performance are final under state
law" those aspects should not be affected by rejection. 3 ° But it
is clear that rejection is an all-or-nothing proposition; an executory
contract or lease must be assumed in whole or rejected in
whole. 3' In most cases, this protects the Other Party by prevent-
129. Id. at 255-257; see also Midway Motor Lodge of Elk Grove v. Innkeepers' Tele-
management & Equip. Corp., 54 F.3d 406, 407 (7th Cir. 1995); In re Fleishman, 138 B.R. 641,
648 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992); In re A.J. Lane & Co., 107 B.R. 435, 439 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1989); In re Waldron, 36 B.R. 633, 642 n.4 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984), rev'd on other grounds,
785 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding specific performance unavailable as a remedy for rejec-
tion). But see In re Solokoff, 200 B.R. 300, 301 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996); In re West Chestnut
Realty of Haverford, Inc., 177 B.R. 501 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (suggesting that specific
performance may be available upon rejection if it would be available under state law).
130. Id. at 333.
131. See, e.g., Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Old Republic National Title Ins. Co., 83 F.3d
735, 741 (5th Cir. 1996); Department of Air Force v. Carolina Parachute Corp., 907 F.2d
1469, 1472 (4th Cir. 1990); Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303,1311
(5th Cir. 1985); Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 876 (3d Cir. 1984).
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ing a debtor from picking those aspects of a contract that benefit
the debtor and assuming those, while rejecting the quid pro quo
originally negotiated to obtain those benefits. But this doctrine is
equally applicable to the Other Party, who can not seek to limit the
impact of rejection to those parts of the contract or lease it
chooses. Once a lease is rejected, the rights of the Other Par-
ty/Lessee to retain property of the estate which were created by
that lease are no longer enforceable. Pursuant to section 542, the
Lessee has an obligation to turn over the property to the trustee.
Any damages caused by the loss of the property are also included
in the Lessee's claim, which is treated on a parity basis with the
claims of all other unsecured creditors. Enforcement of the lessee's
contractual right to retain the leased property would result in
nothing more than partial specific performance of the rejected
lease, which is an unjustifiable violation of the equality principle.
Professor Westbrook argues that no bankruptcy rule or policy
justifies a result that strips the Other Party of its property rights
(ITIs) in the face of a breach by the Debtor. He states that the
"contract doctrine would not permit the breacher to benefit from its
own breach" by recovering the conveyed property, and bankruptcy
should treat the parties in the same way.132 But that statement
has a strong moral component that illustrates the same confusion
Westbrook attributes to others between the "breacher" and the
"beneficiary" of rejection. Rejection by the trustee is treated as a
pre-petition breach by the debtor under section 5 02(g) of the Code.
The beneficiary of this decision is not the debtor, but the unsecured
creditors who will share in the estate property as augmented (or
not diminished) by reason of the rejected lease or contract. Yes,
the Other Party suffers a detriment, and one who loses a property
interest suffers more detriment than others, but that detriment is
compensable through the claim process. Outside of bankruptcy,
every creditor can recover the full value of its damages for breach
by the debtor, whether through money or retention of property or
some combination thereof. Bankruptcy policy requires that
remedies be limited to assertion of a claim; enforcement of
property rights created by rejected contracts or leases is inconsis-
tent with the equality principle.
The "fresh start" policy underlying bankruptcy law also
requires that we treat rejection and discharge as rendering property
132. Westbrook, supra note 8, at 308, (emphasis in original).
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rights conveyed by a rejected contract or lease unenforceable. As
Professor Margaret Howard has noted, "Discharge of legal
obligations is an extraordinary exception to the usual obligation
orientation of the law and it must have equally extraordinary
justification.', 133  The most important role of discharge can be
seen as promoting the return of the debtor to productive activity.
In other words, discharge is economically efficient. When the
benefit of one's labors it appropriated by another, the laborer has
no incentive to produce or innovate. Free from the constraints of
debt, a laborer has greater motivation to produce more and
develop new products that will stimulate more demand.
In the context of section 365, rejection of executory contracts
and unexpired leases, coupled with discharge from continfiing
liability thereunder, is an obvious illustration of this principle.
Indeed, many bankruptcies have taken place in part, if not in
whole, in an effort to relieve the Debtor from contractual responsi-
bilities.134 A Debtor can be as improvident in entering into a
contract for the purchase or provision of goods or services or real
property as it can with respect to borrowing money. Just as we
accept the premise that a lender should have no further claim on
the Debtor or its property after discharge of its debt, we should
equally accept that the Other Party to rejected executory contracts
or leases should have no further claim on the Debtor or its
property with respect to the obligations created by those contracts
or leases. If the Debtor was unable to "undo" the property
conveyance made pursuant to a rejected contract or lease, the
benefits of rejection may become illusory. This is especially true
in this Article's models.
Take the Lease Model. Assume that the Debtor as Lessor has
entered into a lease with NDP/Lessee for a twenty year lease of its
principal asset, heavy equipment, at a rent that failed to reflect the
true market value. Two months later, the Debtor files for
bankruptcy protection. The Debtor's trustee clearly wishes to
reject the lease because it is disadvantageous to the estate. If the
consequences of rejection are that the NDP/Lessee keeps the
equipment for the next twenty years at the contractual rate, the
133. Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1047, 1047-48 (1987).
134. See, e.g., In re W&L Assocs., Inc., 71 B.R. 962 (Bankr. E. D. Pa. 1987); In re
Carrere, 64 Bankr. 156 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986); In re Continental Airlines Corp., 38 B.R.
67 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984); In re Rovine Corp., 6 B.R. 661 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980).
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benefits of rejection are completely illusory. The Debtor will be
unable to use its property in the future free of the claims of the
NDP consistent with the goal of rehabilitation and economic
productivity. Congress could not have included "unexpired leases"
in section 365 with the expectation that the principal obligation
under such a lease-the obligation to lease the underlying proper-
ty-was immune from rejection and discharge.
There is certainly no moral reason why a party to an executory
contract or unexpired lease is entitled to more protection from a
Debtor's bankruptcy than any other creditor. Indeed, Congress
has, through its system of priorities and exceptions from dis-
charge,135 specified those situations in which certain creditors are
entitled to preferential treatment. It has done the same with
respect to certain executory contracts and unexpired leases.13 6
One of those situations benefits the NDP/Licensee in the License
Model. Even if the Debtor/Licensor has entered into an unfavor-
able license of technology and economic efficiency and rehabilita-
tion both would suggest that the underlying technology should
return to the Debtor free of the claims of the NDP/Licensee,
Congress has conclude that the equities compel protection of the
NDP/Licensee, even if that protection dooms Debtor's rehabilita-
tion efforts.137 Congress is free to make that judgment. Howev-
er, in the absence of an explicit thumb on the scales, the rehabilita-
tion policy requires that claims subject to discharge be interpreted
broadly,138 and that Debtor's property interests, limited by the
now-unenforceable rejected contracts or leases, be held free and
clear of all claims asserted thereunder. 39
135. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 527, 523 (1994).
136. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
137. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).
138. The legislative history of the definition of "claim" suggests that "[b]y this broadest
possible definition ... the bill contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter
how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case. It permits
the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 309 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266; see also S. REP. No. XX-989, at 21-22 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5807-08.
139. Professor Thomas E. Plank has argued that an interpretation of section 365 that
would permit the trustee to "defeat a non-creditor's property interest" exceeds the
constitutional scope of the bankruptcy power because clause 4 of Section 8 of Article 1 of
the United States Constitution allows Congress to enact laws only if they bear on rights
between a debtor and its creditors. See Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of
Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV. 487, 576 (1996). While his argument would support my
analysis in Part IV with respect to the impact of rejection on third-party secured creditors,
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In sum, I believe that the ability to reject executory contracts
furthers two basic goals of bankruptcy: (1) it facilitates the
rehabilitation of debtors (the "fresh start") by allowing them to be
discharged from burdensome obligations, including the obligation
to continue to convey property interests under the rejected contract
or lease, and (2) it promotes the equal treatment of similarly-
situated creditors by declining to provide contract creditors full
compensation for their claims against the debtor in the form of
specific performance of the contract or lease.14° To the extent
that a NDP retains the ability to enforce provisions of rejected
contracts or retain property rights that would otherwise revert to
the debtor, the purpose behind section 365 is thwarted on both
sides.14' While Congress can (and does) decide that in certain
cases broader public interests outweigh the rehabilitative concerns
of individual debtors, to extend that protective philosophy to all
leases and executory contracts would essentially construe the ability
to reject under section 365 so narrowly as to render it illusory in
many cases. This is not only inconsistent with more than fifty years
of legislative treatment of leases and executory contracts, but would
also provide an unwarranted benefit to contract claimants over
I see no basis for his assertion that a lessee under a rejected lease (who is explicitly given
a "claim" in the bankruptcy case) is not a "creditor" of the debtor.
140. See, e.g., Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043,
1048 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986) ("Allowing specific performance
would obviously undercut the core purpose of rejection under § 365(a)."); cf. NLRB v.
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527-528 (1984) ("Since the policy of Chapter 11 is to permit successful
rehabilitation of debtors, rejection should not be permitted without a finding that policy
would be served by such action .... Thus, the authority to reject an executory contract is
vital to the basic purpose to a Chapter 11 reorganization, because rejection can release the
debtor's estate from burdensome obligations that can impede a successful reorganization.").
141. See, e.g., In re Freeman, 49 F. Supp. 163, 167-68 (S.D. Ga. 1943) (holding that
rejection of a lease by a debtor/lessor deprived lessee of any right to possession). The court
noted:
The equities also preponderate in favor of the removal of the tenant. When
removed he may suffer injury, he and his family. As indicated, however, he is not
remediless. If injury is done that can be measured in dollars he becomes a
creditor of the debtor and may assert his rights and share with other creditors of
the same class in the arrangement proceedings. On the other hand, if he does not
yield immediate possession of the premises, the debtor and his family are injured
because they lose the small equity now but not later or otherwise realizable, above
the mortgage on the home. And the creditors of the debtor, of whom there are
twenty, and who are equally as innocent as the tenant insofar as the proceedings
in bankruptcy are concerned, will be also injured. If this home were the only asset
of the debtor, they might lose their debts entirely.
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others in the debtor's bankruptcy case, consequently undermining
the general principle of equality of treatment of unsecured
creditors.
IV. Property Rights and the Secured Party
Leases and executory contracts of the sort discussed above
both create property rights and limit pre-existing property rights in
the UP If the lease or executory contract is rejected, any property
rights created by the lease or contract, either in the Owner or the
OP, disappear. If the UP "belonged" to the NDP prior to the
contractual arrangement, any property right in the UP created by
the lease or contract in favor of the Debtor, be it a leasehold
interest or stream of payments or license to use intellectual
property, will, in the absence of specific statutory provision to the
contrary, no longer exist and the unfettered property right in the
UP will remain in the NDP On the other hand, if the UP
"belonged" to the Debtor prior to the contract or lease, any
limitations on the property interest of the Debtor in the UP created
by the rejected lease or contract become unenforceable and the
property interest of the NDP carved out of the absolute fee simple
interest of the Debtor (P1 in the Lease Model and License Model)
revests in the Debtor and reunites with the interest in the UP
previously retained by the Debtor. Rejection can therefore be seen
as a means of eliminating personal property interests created by
lease or contract, and of transferring-whether voluntarily (in the
case of the Debtor) or involuntarily (in the case of the NDP)-pro-
perty interests in UP created by an unexpired lease or executory
contract from an OP to an Owner through termination of enforce-
able limitations on fee simple absolute ownership of the UP.
So far the discussion assumes that the repercussions of
rejection redound to the benefit or detriment of only two parties,
the Debtor and the NDP. Given the two alternative identities of
the Debtor (either Owner or OP), the consequences of rejection
can be diagramed as follows:
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IMPACT OF DEBTOR:
REJECTION
ON: OWNER OP
DEBTOR bold unencumbered no property inter-
interest in UP ests remain
NDP no property inter- holds encumbered
ests remain; has interest in UP
claim in bankruptcy
Thus, in the Lease Model, if the Debtor is the Owner of the
leased equipment, upon rejection of the Lease the Debtor owns the
equipment free and clear of any property rights of the NDP/OP.
If the Debtor is the OP, upon rejection of the Lease the Debtor
relinquishes all property rights to the equipment, and it reverts to
the NDP/Owner. Similarly, in the License Model, if the Debtor is
the Owner of the intellectual property, when the license is rejected
the property rights in the UP originally conveyed to the NDP/OP
revert to the Debtor, who then owns the intellectual property free
and clear. If the Debtor is the OP, rejection of the license
terminates any interest the Debtor had in the UP under the license,
and complete ownership of the intellectual property vests in the
NDP/Owner.
Assume, however, that the property interests of Owner or OP
created or limited by the lease or executory contract were not
retained by the Owner or OP, respectively, but instead were
transferred to a third party as security for an obligation. How does
rejection of the contract or lease, and the previously discussed
consequences of that termination, affect the property rights of the
STP?
To analyze this issue, the model must be complicated further,
because either party to a contractual arrangement (Owner or OP)
may convey its rights to an STP, and either Owner or OP may
become the Debtor. The possible permutations have expanded
from two to four, as follows:
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STP
A Debtor can be either Owner or OP; the NDP can also have
either of these two statuses. The STP can take a security interest
in the rights of either Debtor or NDP, in each case in either of its
two possible roles. Looking at each of these potential scenarios,
and applying established principles of state property law, it
becomes clear that the rejection of an executory contract or
unexpired lease, with the consequences previously discussed on the
property interests of the Owner and OP, should have the same
consequences on the STP in all four situations: the STP should
retain a valid security interest either in the UP or the proceeds
thereof which is valid against all parties.
A. Case One: STP with security interest in rights of Debtor-
Owner
As previously discussed, the property interests of an Owner
relating to an executory contract or lease fall into two categories.
First, there is the property interest of the Owner in the UP, a pre-
existing property interest out of which a subset of rights is created
and transferred to the OP by the enforceable provisions of the
lease or contract. In the Lease Model, the UP is the equipment.
In the License Model, the UP is the intellectual property. If the
UP is real property, the STP may obtain an interest in it under
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state real property law in the form of a mortgage or deed of
trust.142  If the UP is personal property (as in the Models), the
STP may take a security interest in the Owner's rights thereto
under the Uniform Commercial Code or (if the property is not
within the scope of the U.C.C.) under non-U.C.C. state or federal
law. 143
Second, there is the property interest of the Owner created by
the lease or contract itself. This property interest will be character-
ized as a "leasehold interest" (in the case of a lease as is the Lease
Model), primarily representing the right to compensation for
possession and use of the property leased,1" or an "account" or
"general intangible" in the case of a right arising under an
executory contract not constituting a lease (such as the license in
the License Model). 145  All of these property interests should be
characterized as personal property for state law purposes.146  The
142. All states recognize a security interest in real property. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 18-40-101 (Michie 1987); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2920 (West 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 49-1 (West 1994); 25 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2101 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 695.01
(West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-30 (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 506-1 (Michie 1993);
IDAHO CODE § 45-901 (1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-8-11-1 (Michie 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 58-2301 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-201 (19XX); NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.015
(19XX); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46-17-1 (West 1989); N.D CENT. CODE § 35-03-01.2 (1987); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 86.010 (1997).
143. Section 9-104 of the Uniform Commercial Code sets forth exclusions from the scope
of Article Nine, including interests in real property other than fixtures, see U.C.C. § 9-1040)
(1977), security interests subject to a federal statute, id. § 9-104(a), and statutory liens for
services or materials, id. § 9-104(c), among others.
144. See id. § 2A-103(m) (definition of "leasehold interest"), (p) (definition of "lessor").
145. See id. § 9-106; see also discussion in text at supra notes 40-42.
146. The U.C.C. is inherently ambiguous about the treatment of the Owner's leasehold
interest if the UP is real property. Compare section 9-102(3) and comment 4 thereto with
Section 9-1040) and comment 2 thereto. Compare also Frearson v. Wingold (In re Equitable
Development Corp.), 617 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the assignment for security
of interest of real estate developer in contracts for the sale of property with home site buyers
held subject to Article Nine filing requirements); Southwest Nat'l Bank v. Southworth (In
re Southworth), 22 B.R. 376 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (holding that the assignment of vendor's
right to receive payment under contract of deed for real property is governed by Article
Nine); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Larson, 17 B.R. 957 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982) (holding that
the security interest granted by first lendor to second lender in promissory notes secured by
mortgages on real estate was perfected by posssession of notes under Article Nine) with
Shuster v. Doane (In re Shuster), 784 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that the assignment
for security of vendor's interest in contract for deed not governed by Article Nine); In re
Bristol Associates, Inc., 505 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that the assignment by lessor
to lender of lease as collateral was excluded from Article Nine); Swanson v. Union State
Bank (In re Hoeppner), 49 B.R. 124 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985) (holding that the assignment
of a vendor's interest under land sale contract for security is not subject to Article Nine).
See generally Robert H. Bowmar, Real Estate Interests as Security Under the UCC: The
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security interest of the STP will attach when the requirements of
section 9-203 of the U.C.C. are satisfied, at which point the interest
becomes enforceable against the Owner."4 7
When the Owner as Debtor rejects the lease or executory
contract, a STP with a security interest in Owner's property interest
in the UP is unharmed. The property interest in the UP held by
the Owner before rejection remains with Owner after rejection.
Indeed, except to the extent that the OP is protected by specific
statutory savings clauses,148 the property interest in the UP held
by the Owner has now expanded from one circumscribed by
enforceable provisions of the lease or contract to one free from
those limitations. Does the STP get the benefit of this increased
collateralization? If the security agreement/mortgage was properly
drafted, outside of bankruptcy the answer would certainly be yes.
For example, assume the security agreement granted the STP a
security interest in "all of Debtor's right, title and interest in and
to the equipment listed on Schedule A," and the equipment so
listed was leased to OP prior to the time the STP took the security
interest. Under section 2A-307(2) of the U.C.C., the STP would
take its security interest subject to the lease contract.149  Howev-
Scope of Article Nine, 12 U.C.C. L. J. 99 (1979); David A. Redle, Article 9: Identifying
Collateral as Real or Personal Property, 23 U.C.C. L. J. 185 (1990); Note, An Article Nine
Scope Problem-Mortgages, Leases, and Rents as Collateral, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 449 (1976).
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, I believe that section 9-1040) should be read
as narrowly as possible to increase the scope of Article Nine with respect to real estate-
related collateral. However, the general principles discussed herein should apply even were
the STP deemed to hold a non-U.C.C. real estate interest.
147. See U.C.C. § 9-203. Section 9-203 provides in part that a security interest is not
enforceable against the debtor or third parties with respect to the collateral and does not
attach unless:
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to
agreement,... or the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a
description of the collateral ... ;
(b) value has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.
148. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
149. See U.C.C. § 2A-301. Section 2A-301 of the UCC provides as a baseline rule that,
except as otherwise provided in Article 2A, "a lease contract is effective and enforceable
according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the goods and against
creditors of the parties." Id. A consensual creditor of a lessor generally obtains priority
over a lessee with respect to leased goods pursuant to section 2A-307(2) only if:
(a) the creditor holds a lien that attached to the goods before the lease
contract became enforceable;
(b) the creditor holds a security interest in the goods and the lessee did not
give value and receive delivery of the goods without knowledge of the security
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er, once the lease terminates, the STP would continue to have a
security interest in the equipment, free of the leasehold interest of
lessee.150
Does the Bankruptcy Code affect this analysis? Under section
552(a) of the Code, property acquired by the estate after the
commencement of a bankruptcy case is not subject to a pre-
bankruptcy security interest, except as provided in section 552(b)
with respect to proceeds and related concepts.1 5' One could
argue that the lessee's leasehold interest in the equipment acquired
by the Debtor during the bankruptcy case should be characterized
as property acquired by the estate after commencement of the case
and thus should not be seen as subject to the STP's security interest
under section 552(a). However, that argument is flawed. Again,
assuming the security agreement so provided, the property in which
the STP had a security interest was all of Debtor's interest in the
specified equipment (the UP in our example). That interest was an
absolute ownership interest. While the lease is in effect, it is worth
less than it would be without the lease, but the nature of the
interest is identical; no new property is created by the rejection and
termination of the lease. 152  Therefore, the full value of the
interest; or
(c) the creditor holds a security interest in the goods which was per-
fected ... before the lease contract became enforceable.
150. See id. § 2A-307. This section is merely a rule of priority; when a prior interest to
the collateral terminates, the previously subordinated interest will prevail.
151. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994). The section provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, property acquired
by the estate or by the debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject
to any lien resulting from any security agreement entered into by the debtor
before the commencement of the case.
Section 552(b)(1) validates security interests in, among other things, proceeds of
property acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case "if the debtor and an
entity entered into a security agreement before the commencement of the case and if the
security interest created by such security agreement extends to property of the debtor
acquired before the commencement of the case and to proceeds ... of such property." Id.
However, the section allows "the court, after notice and a hearing and based on the equities
of the case, [to] order[ ] otherwise." Id. Section 552(b)(2) gives real estate lenders holding
a valid pre-petition assignment of rents or hotel revenues a security interest in post-petition
rents and hotel revenues, comparable to that provided other secured creditors in post-
petition proceeds under section 552(b)(1).
152. One could also argue that, even were a court to characterize the termination of the
lease as having the effect of transferring a "new" property interest to the Debtor (that being
the leasehold interest of the OP in the leased equipment), that property interest should
properly be characterized as proceeds of the Debtor's prior residual interest in the leased
equipment, which has been disposed of by rejection of the lease. There are two problems
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Debtor/Owner's interest in the UP should become subject to the
security interest of the STP after rejection of the lease or executory
contract, and the claim of the STP should be treated as secured to
that extent under section 506.'
If the STP has a security interest in the UP, even if it also has
a security interest in the Debtor/Owner's interests in the lease or
executory contract as well, its position upon rejection will be
protected. As an economic matter, its interests with respect to the
UP and its earning power represented by the lease or executory
contract should be identical to that of the Debtor/Owner. Absent
differences in business judgment between the Debtor and the STP,
if the lease or contract is a "bad" deal from the standpoint of the
Debtor/Owner (in the sense that superior benefits could be derived
were the Debtor/Owner free to redeploy the UP with another OP),
it is also a "bad" deal from the standpoint of the STP who obtains
the diminished collateral value represented by the existing
arrangement. Any advantages accruing to the Debtor/Owner when
the lease or contract is rejected and a new lease or contract
obtained will also redound to the benefit of the STP, as any new
interest in the UP will be subordinate to that of the STP. 15
4
What if the STP does not have a security interest in the
Debtor/Owner's interests in the UP, but solely in the Debt-
or/Owner's interests created by the lease or executory contract
itself, that is, the leasehold interests, accounts, or general intangi-
bles? In that situation, again unless the result has been modified
by statutory savings clauses (in which event not only the OP but
with this approach. First, proceeds are currently defined to require a "disposition" of
collateral, except with respect to distributions made with respect to investment property. See
U.C.C. § 9-306(1). Although a modification to the definition of "proceeds" is proposed to
include "whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of, collateral," id. § 9-313(a)(2),
Revised Article 9, Proposed Final Draft (April 15, 1998) (American Law Institute), that
change has not yet been made. Furthermore, even were a secured party to convince a
bankruptcy court that the leasehold interest of lessee constituted proceeds of the lessor's
residual interest, the court retains the right to retain the benefit of proceeds for other
creditors based on the equities of the case under section 552(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.
153. See 11 U.S.C. § 506. Section 506 allows a claim to be treated as a "secured claim"
"to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such
property." Id. If the security agreement is drafted to create a security interest in "all" of the
Debtor's interest in the collateral, as that interest expands, so does the security interest. See
id.
154. If the UP is subsequently leased, under U.C.C. § 2A-307(2)(a) of the UCC the
previously attached lien has priority. A subsequent licensee would not be entitled to any of
the special priority rules for certain buyers and purchasers under sections 9-307 through 9-
309, and thus would take subject to the perfected security interest of the STP.
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also the STP will be protected from the premature termination of
its property rights), the rejection of the lease or executory contract
terminates the personal property rights created thereby and in
which the STP had its interest.
Deferring until our discussion in part IV.C the issue of whether
the Bankruptcy Code protects the STP from rejection of the lease
or contract in these circumstances,155 the STP should nevertheless
be protected as a matter of state property law. At first blush, one
might assume that, if the Debtor/Owner's property interest has
disappeared with rejection, the STP's security interest has also
evaporated. But in this situation, the STP should be able to claim
a right to the Debtor/Owner's rights in the UP as proceeds of the
contractual rights in which it previously had a security interest.
"Proceeds" include anything "received upon ... disposition of
collateral." '156 When the Debtor/Owner rejects a lease or execu-
tory contract, it specifically decides as a matter of its business
judgment to dispose of the benefits afforded by that contract in
order to obtain a discharge of its obligations thereunder. That
disposition of personal property collateral, unless authorized by the
STP, results in the security interest of the STP continuing in the
collateral in the hands of a transferee, and in any identifiable
proceeds of the collateral.5 7 Here the collateral (the leasehold
interest, account and/or general intangible) is not transferred to
anyone; it simply ceases to exist. Therefore, the STP cannot follow
the collateral into other hands. However, there are identifiable
proceeds of that collateral in the form of the former interest of the
NDP/OP in the UP, now revested in the Debtor/Owner. The
security interest of the STP automatically attaches to this property
interest pursuant to the provisions of section 9-306(2) of the U.C.C.
155. See infra notes 177-179 and accompanying text.
156. U.C.C. § 9-306(1).
157. See id. § 9-306(2). That section provides:
(2) Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest
continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof
unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security
agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including
collections received by the debtor.
The reference to an "authorized" disposition has been interpreted by the Permanent
Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code to mean a situation in which the secured
party has authorized disposition free and clear of the security interest. See PEB Commen-
tary No. 3, sections 9-306(2), 9-402(7) (March 10, 1990). Unless the secured party has
obtained replacement collateral, it is unlikely to have authorized the rejection of a lease or
executory contract that create the rights constituting its collateral.
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This result can be analogized to the position of a chattel paper
or accounts receivable financer under section 9-306(5) of the
U.C.C. when goods the sale of which gave rise to the chattel paper
or account are returned or repossessed. Under section 9-306(5)(b)
and (c), the unpaid transferee of chattel paper or an account
resulting from the original sale of the returned goods "has a
security interest in the goods against the transferor."'58 Essential-
ly, in making the decision under section 365 of the Code to reject
a lease or executory contract, the Debtor/Owner has decided to
repossess the property interest conveyed to the NDP/OP pursuant
to that lease or executory contract. The original conveyance gave
rise to an interest, analogous to the chattel paper or account in
section 9-306(5), a security interest in which was granted to the
STP, an unpaid transferee. If, under section 9-306(5), an unpaid
financer of chattel paper or accounts receivable in this situation
would have a security interest in the returned goods, then under
section 9-306(2) the STP should have a security interest in the
repossessed property interest as against the transferor (the
Debtor/Owner) after rejection pursuant to section 365.
Applying this analysis to the Models, the result is that if the
STP has a security interest in Debtor/Owner's leasehold interest
and Debtor rejects the Lease, Debtor thereby "disposes" of the
leasehold interest and in exchange recaptures the property interest
of the NDP created by the rejected Lease (P1 in the Model). That
property interest should be seen as the proceeds of the leasehold
interest for purposes of the U.C.C., and the security interest of the
STP should attach to the UP in Debtor's hands. 59
Of course, as in the case of all security interests in proceeds,
the bankruptcy court retains the power, applying principles of
equity, to capture the benefit of the property interest represented
by proceeds for the benefit of creditors other than the STP160
158. We do not need to deal here with the priority of that security interest as against a
secured party secured by the UP. Compare U.C.C. § 9-306(5) with U.C.C. § 9-308.
159. Although one may feel a frisson of discomfort at the thought that the STP, which
formerly had a security interest only in a leasehold interest in the UP, now should have an
interest in the UP itself, the structure of section 9-306(2) of the U.C.C. is intended to provide
a secured creditor more collateral upon an unauthorized disposition of its collateral (in the
form of the original collateral in the hands of the transferee, as well as the proceeds of the
disposition in the hands of the transferor) than it had previously.
160. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1994). Section 552(b)(1) of the Code extends the security
interest to after-acquired proceeds "except to any extent that the court, after notice and a
hearing and based on the equities of the case, orders otherwise." Id. The equitable power
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However, absent any contrary determination by the bankruptcy
court, the STP with a security interest in the property of a
Debtor/Owner should retain a security interest in property of the
Debtor/Owner notwithstanding the rejection of the lease or
executory contract creating, or limiting the rights of the Debt-
or/Owner in, such property.
B. Case Two: STP with security interest in rights of NDP/OP
The property rights of the NDP/OP available to a secured
creditor are limited to those interests ("leasehold interests" or
"general intangibles") created by the contract or lease itself. The
OP has no pre-existing interest in the UP, and any interest created
by the contract or lease disappears with its rejection. That is, the
interest is taken back by the Owner/Debtor.
Outside of bankruptcy, if a STP has a security interest in
property of a debtor and that property is transferred to a third
party, whether voluntarily by the debtor or involuntarily through
writ of execution or foreclosure, the security interest of the STP
continues unless the STP authorizes the transfer free and clear of
the security interest.161 This principle applies even when the third
party into whose hands the collateral is transferred is the original
owner from whom the STP's debtor obtained it.162 Although no
examples have been found in which the return of the property to
the original owner from the STP's debtor was occasioned by the
termination of the contract between them, there is no reason to
distinguish this type of transfer from any other.
The Bankruptcy Code complicates the analysis slightly. When
the Debtor/Owner makes the determination that rejection of a
of the court was intended to be invoked in circumstances in which the secured creditor has
been benefitted by the dedication of estate funds to the collateral in transforming it into
proceeds. See, e.g., Delbridge v. Production Credit Ass'n & Fed. Land Bank, 104 B.R. 824,
826 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (citing S. Rep. No. XX-989, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5877).
161. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2); see also supra note 157.
162. An example of the circumstances in which this is most likely to occur is when a
seller of collateral retains a purchase money security interest in the collateral in the hands
of the purchaser/debtor, who then obtains additional financing on the same collateral on a
subordinated basis. If the purchaser/debtor defaults on its obligations to the seller, the seller
may repossess the collateral, but it remains subject to the security interest of the second
financer. Of course, the seller may then dispose of the collateral, thereby discharging not
only its own security interest but also that of the subordinated second financer, who will
receive any proceeds of disposition in excess of the expenses of sale and satisfaction of the
priority indebtedness. See U.C.C. § 9-504.
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lease or contract is in the best interests of the Debtor, central to its
decision is the belief that the estate should be able to benefit from
the property interests in the UP without the limitations created by
the lease or contract. In other words, the Debtor wishes to take
back from the OP the property interests in the UP conveyed by the
rejected contract or lease, and redeploy those property interests for
a higher consideration. We have already seen that, absent specific
statutory provisions to the contrary, the OP has no right to retain
the benefits of the property interests conveyed because the lease or
contract that gave the OP that right becomes unenforceable in
whole with its rejection. One could argue that the bankruptcy
policy underlying rejection-that of permitting the Debtor to
recapture the benefit of the property interests in the UP conveyed
by the lease or contract-would be undermined if the OP's
conveyance of an interest in those same property rights to an STP
could not be defeated by the Debtor/Owner. 63 Why should the
163. This was precisely the rationale given by the court in In re Bernard, 69 B.R. 13
(Bankr. D. Haw. 1986), for concluding that the rejected lease under which the lessee had
conveyed a leasehold mortgage was terminated. The court noted:
If it is determined that a lease is still in existence and subject to the leasehold
mortgage even after the lease is deemed rejected, the lessor will continue to be
frustrated in obtaining income from his commercial property .... This means that
the lessor will be further frustrated and the purpose of Section 365(d)(4) will not
be achieved.
Id. at 14-15; see also In re 6177 Realty Associates, Inc., 142 B.R. 1017, 1019 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1992) (holding that the rejection of a lease by a lessee terminated interest of sublessee under
section 365(d)(4)); In re Giles Associates, Ltd., 92 B.R. 695 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (finding
rejection of a lease by debtor/lessee terminated lien on leasehold interest); In re Gillis, 92
B.R. 461 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1988) (holding that the rejection of a lease by a debtor/lessee com-
pletely extinguished bank's security interest on leasehold); In re Hawaii Dimensions, Inc., 39
B.R. 606 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1984), affd, 47 B.R. 425 (D. Haw. 1985) (holding that the
rejection of a lease by a debtor/lessee resulted in termination of lease under which bankrupt
secured creditor had security interest).
However, there is nothing in the language of section 365(d)(4), which establishes a
period during which the lessee of nonresidential real property must assume or reject the
lease or it will be deemed rejected and directs that the trustee "immediately surrender" the
property subject to the rejected lease to the lessor, or in its legislative history that suggests
that anything more was intended than to limit to 60 days the period of uncertainty inflicted
on a lessor and its other tenants as to whether the lease in question would be assumed to
rejected. See 130 CONG. REC. S 8891 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Senator Hatch),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 590, 598 ("The first problem which this bill would remedy is
the long-term vacancy or partial operation of space by a bankrupt tenant"). See generally
In re Moreggia & Sons, Inc., 852 F.2d 1179, 1185 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he purpose of Section
365(d)(4) is to protect lessors from delay and uncertainty by forcing the trustee or debtor-in-
possession to act quickly to assume unexpired leases.").
I believe that the motivating force behind many of those decisions concluding that
rejection does not result in termination of an executory contract or lease was the desire
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STP be allowed to cloud the Debtor's interest in the UP and
impede its ability to rehabilitate itself?
The short answer is that the Code respects property rights
created by state law. Rejection of the contract or lease terminates
the property rights of the OP as a matter of state law because the
contract between the Debtor/Owner and the NDP/OP becomes
unenforceable. Whether rejection of the contract or lease termi-
nates the property rights of the STP should also be determined by
state law, and as a matter of state law this retaking of the property
rights of the OP to the Debtor/Owner without fault by the OP
should not affect the property rights of third parties, such as the
STP, in the retaken property.
Take the case of an executory contract between Debtor/Owner
and OP dealing with UP constituting personal property. While that
contract is in effect, the position of the OP can be seen as one with
voidable title to the property, who has the power to transfer good
title (that is, a valid security interest) to a good faith purchaser for
value."6  Despite the rejection of the contract rendering OP's
courts to protect the secured party from what they assumed would be the consequences of
such termination-elimination of the security interest. See, e.g., In re Austin Development
Co., 19 F.3d 1077 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 874 (1994) (protecting holder of deed of
trust on debtor/lessee's leasehold interest upon rejection); Leasing Service Corp. v. First
Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n., 826 F.2d 434 (6th Cir. 1987) (protecting assignee of equipment lease
with security interest in equipment upon rejection of lease by debtor/lessee); In re Garfinkle,
577 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1978) (protecting holder of leasehold mortgage on debtor/lessee's
interest upon rejection); In re Argonaut Financial Services, Inc., 164 B.R. 107 (N.D. Cal.
1994) (holding that a 60-day period for assumption or rejection cannot run against alleged
holders of security interest in leasehold who did not receive notice as a matter of due process
because their security interest would be adversely affected by deemed rejection); see also In
re H.B. Leasing Co., 188 B. R. 810, 815 (Bankr. E. D. Tex. 1995) (dictum) (noting that even
if assignment from lessee to debtor had been effective, rejection could not be interpreted to
forfeit security interest of creditor in leasehold); In re Locke, 180 B.R. 245, 261 (termination
of debtor/lessee's right to possession under rejected lease did not terminate judgment
creditor's lien on interest in lease); cf. In re Elephant Bar Restaurant, Inc., 195 B.R. 353, 356
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) (finding the lease was terminated "with respect to the debtor," but
"may exist" with respect to nondebtor sublessee "to the extent recognized under pertinent
nonbankruptcy law"); In re Ames Dep't. Stores, Inc. 148 B.R. 756, 758 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1993) (holding that rejection of lease by debtor/lessee did not terminate lease so as to relieve
prior lessee who assigned lease to debtor of responsibility for performance after assignment
as provided in lease).
164. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1). Section 2-403(1) states that "[a] person with voidable title
has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value." Id. "Voidable title"
is not defined in section 2-403(1), but four examples are given:
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or
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property interests void, as a matter of state law the STP should
retain good title (a valid security interest) in the OP's property,
albeit in the hands of another party (the Owner).
Consider instead the situation in which the UP is subject to a
lease to the OP and the Debtor/Owner rejects the lease. In the
case of leases of real property, section 365(h)(1)(A) of the Code
prevents the termination of the OP/lessee's leasehold interest
without the OP/lessee's election to treat it as terminated, an
election that cannot be made if precluded by any agreement made
with the lessee.165 Assuming the STP has inserted an appropriate
limitation on the ability of the OP as lessee to treat the lease as
terminated, the interest of the STP in the property of the OP will
continue with the continued interest of the OP notwithstanding
rejection.
If the STP has not contractually precluded the lessee election
under section 365(h)(1)(A), or if the UP is not real property so that
section 365(h)(1)(A) is not applicable, rejection of the lease
terminates the interest of the OP thereunder. Were that termina-
tion occasioned by the default of the OP under the lease, the
interest of the STP (like that of a sublessee) would be deemed
subordinate to the interest of the Debtor/Owner (lessor) of the
property and the termination of the lease by rejection would result
in termination of the mortgage or security interest as a matter of
state law. 166  However, the termination of the leasehold interest
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the
criminal law.
A "purchaser" is a person who takes by "purchase," U.C.C. § 1-201(33), including
"taking by mortgage, pledge, lien ... or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest
in property." Id.
165. See supra note 93. The language limiting the lessee's ability to elect termination of
a lease after rejection by the lessor was added by the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code, and protects leasehold mortgagees and subtenants by permitting them to obtain
contractual agreements by the lessee not to make such an election.
166. See, e.g., In re Child World, Inc., 142 B.R. 87, 89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Dial-
A-Tire, Inc., 78 B.R. 13, 16 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1987); City of Hamtramck v. Roesink, 281
N.W. 539 (Mich. 1938); Anjo Restaurant Corp. v. Sunrise Hotel Corp., 414 N.Y.S. 2d 265,
268 (N.Y. 1979); Jacob Hoffmann Brewing Co. v. Wuttge, 138 N.E. 411 (N.Y App. Div.
1923). See generally RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, 4 POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY 461, at 37-287 (1997) ("[A] mortgage ceases to have consequences as an interest
in land whenever the mortgagor's interest in the premises ends."); MILTON R. FRIEDMAN,
1 FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 7.801, at 444 (4th ed. 1997) ("A mortgage on a lease ... is like
a mortgage on a toy balloon. Prick it and it's gone. And so with a leasehold mortgage if the
lease is terminated in accord with its terms before its specified expiration.").
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as a result of rejection of the lease by the Debtor/Owner is not
based on any fault of the OP/lessee but on the business judgment
of the trustee for the Debtor/Owner that the lease is not in the best
interests of the estate. Under these circumstances, the leasehold
returned to the Debtor/Owner should be encumbered by the
interest of the STP, by analogy to the state law concept of
"surrender."
Outside of bankruptcy, surrender of a lease is a consensual act
by which the tenant offers the leasehold to the landlord, and .the
landlord may elect to accept it at the cost of relieving the tenant of
obligations accruing under the lease after the surrender. Although
surrender frequently occurs when the tenant is in default of the
lease,'67 it may occur under other circumstances as well. 168  If
surrender occurs, the rights of third parties in the surrendered
leasehold (such as sublessees or secured parties) are unaffected; the
lessee can surrender only those rights it has and the landlord can
not abrogate the rights of third parties absent default. 69
The return of the leasehold interest of the NDP/OP to the
Debtor/Owner is not consensual on the part of the NDP/OP in the
sense of a non-bankruptcy "surrender," but it should not be
Of course, a secured creditor obtaining an interest in a leasehold may obtain an
agreement from the lessor to subordinate its interest to the interest of the secured creditor,
in which event the security interest would survive even foreclosure for default of the lessee.
See, e.g., In re JAS Enterprises, Inc., 180 B.R. 210 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995) (holding that
rejection did not affect holder of leasehold interest when lessor had subordinated its interest
to lienholder).
167. See, e.g., Warnert v. MGM Properties, 362 N.W.2d 364 (Minn. 1985).
168. See, e.g., Parris-West Maytag Hotel Corp. v. Continental Amusement Co., 168
N.W.2d 735 (Iowa 1969) (lease surrendered in connection with sale of property).
169. As stated in 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 263 (1995):
Although a surrender operates between the parties as an extinguishment of the
interest which is surrendered, it does not do so as to third persons who at the time
of the surrender had rights which such an extinguishment would destroy; as to
them, the surrender operates only as a grant subject to their right, and the interest
surrendered still lies for its preservation, that is, interests in the leasehold acquired
by third parties prior to the surrender will not be defeated by operation of the
surrender.
See also, e.g., Goldberg v. Tri-States Theatre Corp., 126 F.2d 26, 28 (8th Cir. 1942); Warnert,
362 N.W.2d at 368; Futterman v. South African Airways, 481 N.Y.S.2d 283, 286 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1984); Parris-West Maytag Hotel, 168 N.W.2d at 738-39; Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Rice,
72 A.2d 197, 199-200 (N.J. 1950); Shaw v. Creedon, 32 A.2d 721, 723 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div.
1943); cf. National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Correale Mining Corp., 140 F. Supp. 180, 184
(D. W. Va. 1956) (holding that when a lease was subject to forfeiture because of lessee
default and lessor demanded that lessee surrender the lease instead and lessee agreed,
sublease terminated).
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analogized to a forfeiture of the leasehold for default by the lessee.
The consequences to the third party of the transfer of the leasehold
interest should turn not on voluntariness but on whether the
transfer occurs because of the default of the lessee, a risk the third
party assumed when taking a legally subordinated interest in a
leasehold. Thus, even if the transfer is involuntary, if it does not
occur because of a default by the lessee entitling the lessor to claim
forfeiture of the leasehold, the leasehold should transfer to the
Debtor/Owner encumbered by the STP's security interest.
The Debtor's need to make productive use of the property in
its rehabilitation is protected under the Code against the claims of
the STP, as it is against all creditor claims. Although the STP's
security interest in the property created by the contract or lease
should continue in such property when it is repatriated by the
Debtor, by virtue of the rejection the STP has been transformed
from a stranger to the bankruptcy case with a recourse claim
against the NDP/OP into a non-recourse creditor of the Own-
er/Debtor. 7 ° The claim of the STP to Debtor's property is thus
subject to all provisions of the Code, including the automatic
stay,17' the obligation to file a proof of claim,'72 and discharge
of its claim upon liquidation or confirmation of a plan of reorgani-
zation.'73
In the Lease Model, if the STP has a security interest in the
NDP/OP/Lessee's leasehold interest in the equipment, upon
rejection of the lease by the Debtor/Owner/Lessor, the property
interest previously held by Lessee (P1) reverts to Debtor. To the
extent of the value of that property interest, the STP becomes a
secured creditor of Debtor, secured by a security interest in the
170. One who holds a claim against property of a debtor is treated by the Bankruptcy
Code as holding a claim against the debtor, see 11 U.S.C. § 102(2) (1994), and thus
constitutes a "creditor" under section 101(10). See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S.
78 (1991) (holding that a mortgage lien securing obligation on which debtor's personal
liability was previously discharged in Chapter 7 case was a "claim" subject to rescheduling
under Chapter 13). Under section 1111(b) of the Code, such claim is allowed to the same
extent as any secured claim under section 502 under most circumstances, but the claim will
be secured only "to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest
in such property" under Section 506(a). Id. § 502. Thus, if the leasehold interest of the
NDP/OP in which the STP had a security interest was valued at $1 million, the claim against
the Debtor/Owner is a secured claim (secured by the UP) to the extent of $1 million, even
if the UP is worth several times that.
171. See 11 U.S.C. § 362.
172. See id. § 501.
173. See id. §§ 727, 1141, 1228, 1328.
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equipment. In the License Model, when the license is rejected by
Debtor/Owner/Licensor, absent protective legislation, the Licens-
ee's interest in the intellectual property returns to Debtor, but the
STP becomes a creditor of Debtor with a secured claim limited in
value to the value of the property interest (P1) so returned.
Affording the STP this protection is not inequitable. The only
reason the Debtor/Owner is able to eradicate the NDP/OP's
property interest is because the Code, in section 365, has decided
that state law rights must give way to the important bankruptcy
policies of equality of treatment of similarly-situated creditors, and
the Debtor's need for a fresh start though a second look at its
executory contractual obligations. No such policies require
elimination of the STP's interest. The STP was never a creditor of
the Debtor prior to bankruptcy, and when it becomes one through
the operation of rejection of the lease or contract, it is treated in
exactly the same way as all other secured creditors of the Debtor.
The equality policy is fully honored. With respect to the fresh start
policy, the Debtor should not be better off with respect to an STP
with a secured claim against an interest in the Debtor's property in
the hands of an OP than it would be had the secured claim been
created by the Debtor itself. Absent exercise of an avoiding
power,174 the Debtor could not render unenforceable a security
interest in its property while such property was in its own hands,
and the Code provides no basis for doing so when the property is
in the hands of another. If the Debtor wishes to protect itself
against the possibility of such secured claims created by third
parties, it can always require the OP to agree in the lease or
contract by which the property rights are created not to create
security interests in those property rights.17 5
C. Case Three: STP with security interest in rights of Debtor/OP
When the STP has a security interest in property interests of
a Debtor/OP created by a lease or contract, the STP is a secured
174. The avoiding powers include, among others, the "strong-arm power" under section
544(a) that allows the trustee to avoid an unperfected security interest, the power to avoid
preferential transfers under section 544(b) and section 547 of the Code, and the power to
avoid fraudulent conveyances under section 548.
175. These so-called "negative pledge" clauses (precluding the creation of security
interests in assets of the covenanting party) are quite common in debtor/creditor contracts.
For examples, see AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE LEGAL FORMS, Banks §§ 38.271 (2d ed.
1996).
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creditor of the Debtor/OP and entitled to the protections afforded
all secured creditors with respect to their collateral. Rejection of
a lease or contract does not affect the STP's status (that is, it does
not constitute rejection of the security agreement itself).'76
Rejection does, however, have a significant impact upon the
collateral subject to the STP's security interest. Can the Debt-
or/Owner reject under these circumstances? Rejection here can be
seen as the functional equivalent of a disposition of the STP's
collateral.'77 Under section 363(e) of the Code, upon request of
the STP, the court is required to prohibit or condition such
disposition of the property subject to an unexpired lease or contract
as necessary to provide the STP "adequate protection" of its
security interest."8 Generally when collateral is disposed of,
providing the secured creditor the proceeds of the disposition
would be seen as adequate protection of its interest. 179 However,
when the property is held pursuant to a rejected lease or contract,
no consideration is received for the disposition. Of course, the
property may be valueless. In such a case, the STP should be
176. See, e.g., Leasing Service Corp. v. First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 826 F.2d 434, 437
(6th Cir. 1987) (holding that the rejection of lease by debtor/lessee simply determines
whether claim is entitled to pre-petition or administrative priority, but does not affect
security interest because security interest was "non-executory"). A security agreement is not
an executory contract subject to rejection or assumption. See, e.g., In re Pacific Express, Inc.,
780 F.2d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jenson v. Continental Financial Corp., 591 F.2d 477, 482
(8th Cir. 1979); In re Hotel Syracuse, Inc., 155 B.R. 824, 843 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1993).
177. Although some courts have concluded that section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code is
the exclusive remedy available to a debtor party to an executory contract or lease and that
the debtor cannot use section 363 to circumvent the protections afforded the OP pursuant
to section 365, see, e.g., In re Taylor, 198 BR. 142, 164-65 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996); In re Owen-
Johnson, 118 B.R. 780, 783 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990); In re Robinson Truck Line, Inc. 47 B.R.
631 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1985), there is no reason to deny secured creditors the protections
afforded by section 363 when section 365 is utilized by a debtor to dispose of the secured
creditor's collateral.
178. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e). Under Section 363(e), "[A]t any time, on request of an
entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or
leased, by the trustee, the court ... shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is
necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest." Id. Section 363(e) was amended
by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, by the addition of the last
sentence that states that the subsection "also applies to property that is subject to any
unexpired lease of personal property" insofar as such property is not subject to an order
granting relief from the stay under section 362 of the Code.
179. Adequate protection may be provided by "providing to such entity an additional or
replacement lien to the extent that such stay, use, sale, lease, or grant results in a decrease
in the value of such entity's interest in such property." 11 U.S.C. § 361; see, e.g., In re
Collins, 180 B.R. 447, 452 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995); In re Williamson, 43 B.R. 813, 820 n.4
(Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (adequate protection provided by lien on proceeds of sale).
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indifferent to the decision to reject and would not challenge it. But
more likely the value of the lease or contract to the debtor given the
security interest (the debtor's equity in the property) is insufficient
to justify its retention.
When the Debtor/OP rejects the lease or executory contract,
under the same principles applicable to Case Two, impact of that
rejection upon the security interest of the STP in the leasehold
interest or general intangibles of the Debtor/OP should be
determined by state law. If the STP has not consented to the
disposition of its collateral and its security interest is subject to the
U.C.C., that security interest should continue in that collateral even
as the collateral migrates back to the NDP/Owner. 8 ° Similarly,
if the STP has a leasehold mortgage or security interest, the interest
of the STP in what was formerly property of the Debtor/OP should
remain valid when the property is effectively surrendered to the
Owner.' The analogy to surrender is even stronger here than
in Case Two because the decision to relinquish the leasehold
interest is voluntary on the part of the Debtor/OP, even if the
consent of the Owner to the surrender is inferred as a matter of
law under the Code.
Thus, in the Lease Model, if the STP has a security interest in
the Debtor/OP's leasehold interest and the Debtor rejects the
Lease, the property interest of the Debtor in the equipment (P1)
should migrate back to the NDP/Owner encumbered by the
security interest of the STP. Similarly, for the License Model, the
intellectual property interest of the Debtor/OP that was the
collateral for the STP remains its collateral even after its disposi-
tion by the Debtor to the NDP/Owner through rejection of the
license.
One could argue that the transfer of the leasehold or property
rights under an executory contract by a Debtor/OP should not be
treated as would a "surrender" because the STP took the risk of
being subordinated to the NDP/Owner in the event of the Debt-
180. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2); supra note 155.
181. Cf. In re Garfinkle, 577 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1978) (concluding that rejection of
lease by trustee for Debtor/lessee did not terminate leasehold estate which was encumbered
by mortgage in favor of third party, but merely "placed the leasehold outside of the
bankruptcy administration" in the hands of the Debtor/lessee). Although I believe the Fifth
Circuit correctly concluded that the mortgagee's interest in the leasehold estate is preserved,
I disagree with the court in its conclusion that the estate (subject to the mortgage) migrates
to the Debtor/lessee rather than to the NDP/lessor.
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or/OP's default, and bankruptcy is certainly a default. Indeed, in
most of those cases involving third party interests in property rights
of a Debtor/OP under a rejected lease or executory contract in
which the court has concluded that the rejection results in termina-
tion of the lease or contract, the court has also concluded or
assumed that the third party interests disappear with rejection.'82
However, although the Debtor is in bankruptcy, rejection of a
lease or executory contract may occur even though the Debtor is
completely current on its payments and has complied with all other
obligations under the contract or lease. In other words, rejection
is not a substituted form of remedy for the NDP/Owner; rather, it
is a decision made by the trustee for the Debtor/OP with respect
to its property interests and future obligations. As such, rejection
could be seen as equivalent to abandonment of the property
interests created by the executory contract or lease and should have
consequences similar to those resulting from abandonment of
property under section 554 of the Code.18' The security interest
of the secured creditor in the abandoned property is unaffected by
the abandonment, and remains effective in the hands of the debtor
to whom the property is abandoned by the estate.184
Transfer of the leasehold or property rights created by the
rejected executory contract will bifurcate the STP's secured claim
against the Debtor/OP into an unsecured claim against the
182. See, e.g., In re Elephant Bar Restaurant, 195 B.R. 353 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996); In
re Child World, Inc., 142 B.R. 87 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Stalter & Co., 99 B.R. 327,
330-31 (E.D. La. 1989); In re Fillard Apartments, Ltd., 96 B.R. 397 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989);
In re Giles Assoc., Ltd., 92 B.R. 695 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988); In re Gillis, 92 B.R. 461
(Bankr. D. Haw. 1988); In re Bernard, 69 B.R. 13 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1986); In re Hawaii
Dimensions, Inc., 39 B.R. 606 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1984), affd, 47 BR. 425 (D. Haw. 1985);
Mayfield Smithson Enter. v. Corn-Quip, Inc., 896 P.2d 1156 (N.M. 1995).
183. See 11 U.S.C. § 554. Section 554 both authorizes the trustee to abandon "any
property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and
benefit to the estate" and allows the court to order the trustee to do so on request of a party
in interest. If the property is abandoned by the trustee, it is no longer property of the estate
and title thereto reverts back to the debtor. See, e.g., In re Rodall, 165 B.R. 506 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1994); In re Reed, 94 B.R. 48 (E. D. Pa. 1988). See generally 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 58, 365.09[3][b], at 365-75. The similarity of rejection and
abandonment has been noted by several courts. See, e.g., In re Gravure Paper & Bd. Corp.,
234 F.2d 928, 930-931 (3d Cir. 1956); In re Bacon, 212 B.R. 66, 68 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997).
See generally Raymond T. Nimmer, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Protecting the
Fundamental Terms, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 507, 519 (1983).
184. See, e.g., In re Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1982). See generally 5 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 58, 554.02[3], at 554-5. Indeed, the most frequent reason for
abandonment may be that assets constituting collateral are worth less than the amount of the
debt (i.e., there is no equity in the assets for the estate).
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Debtor/OP (the value of the collateral for purposes of section 506
of the Code having been reduced to zero) and a nonrecourse
security interest in property of the NDP/Owner. The STP's
property interests created by state law are thus respected, the
Debtor has the benefit of rejection, and the NDP/Owner has both
its claim in the bankruptcy case of the Debtor and its property
rights in the UP, encumbered only by the interest of the STP rather
than by the interest of the OP and the STP
D. Case Four: STP with security interest in rights of NDP/
Owner
The fourth scenario is similar to the first. The property
interests of the NDP/Owner (in which the STP may have a security
interest) are of two types: (1) the interest in the UP and the (2)
interest created by the lease or contract. With respect to the first
type of property interest, the rejection of the contract or lease by
the Debtor/OP results in the elimination of any restrictions created
by the lease or contract on the property interest of the NDP/Owner
in the UP in which the STP has a security interest. As in Case
One, if the security agreement describes the collateral in general
terms (as would ordinarily be the case), the fact that the debtor's
rights in the collateral have expanded by rejection of the lease or
contract imposes limitations on those rights would simply increase
the value of the collateral covered by the security interest. 185 But
here, unlike Case No. 1, the STP remains a stranger to the
bankruptcy case, and the increased collateralization of the STP
occasioned by the rejection does not have any implications for
creditors of a bankrupt. Although the NDP/Owner may wish to
realize upon the returned value in a way other than providing
increased collateralization to the STP, and other creditors of the
NDP/Owner may wish to reach that property interest to satisfy
other debts, those conflicting goals have no bankruptcy policy
implications until and unless the Owner seeks protection from its
creditors. Resolution of these objectives will be resolved by private
contract and negotiation, not by statute. The property interests of
the STP will be respected. Thus, if the STP has a security interest
in the equipment leased in the Lease Model by the NDP/Owner to
the Debtor/OP, when the Debtor rejects the lease, the STP
continues to have a security interest in the equipment, free of any
185. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
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claim by the Debtor. The STP with a security interest in the
intellectual property of the NDP/Owner underlying a rejected
license retains its security interest in that property after such
rejection.
If the security interest of the STP is not in the NDP/Owner's
interests in the UP, but is limited to the NDP/Owner's personal
property interest created by the lease or contract itself (the
"account" or "general intangibles" representing the rights afforded
the NDP/Owner under the lease or contract), the rejection of the
lease or contract has the same result as in Case One. When the
Debtor/OP rejects the lease or contract, resulting in its termination,
the collateral itself is involuntarily disposed of by the NDP/Owner,
but the NDP/Owner is provided two things in exchange. First,
pursuant to section 502(g) of the Code, the NDP/Owner is given a
claim in the bankruptcy case of the Debtor/OP for damages
occasioned by the deemed "breach" of the contract or lease.
Second, the NDP/Owner receives the property interest in the UP
carved out by the rejected lease or contract and previously held by
the Debtor/OP which has now effectively been conveyed back to
the NDP/Owner. Both of these property interests should be
considered "proceeds" of the original collateral of the STP and, as
in Case One, its security interest should continue in them without
further action pursuant to section 9-306(2) of the U.C.C.
V. Conclusion
When an Owner enters into a contract or lease with respect to
UP, it provides the OP property rights to the UP created by the
contract or lease. It agrees to do so only because the OP provides
the Owner a corresponding package of benefits from the lease or
contract, principally a right to payments in respect of the new
property right. These benefits are mutually sustaining. The Owner
would never transfer an interest in the UP to the OP without the
right to a stream of payments; the OP would never agree to make
payment without a property right in the UP.
When the lease or contract is rejected by the Debtor, whether
Owner or OP, that party has made the determination that the
package of benefits created by the lease or contract is not suffi-
ciently beneficial to justify the continuing claims on the bankrupt
estate, either in the form of payments (OP) or loss of property
rights to the UP (Owner). Rejection has the consequence of
voiding the contract, by rendering every one of its provisions
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permanently unenforceable against the Debtor, including those
provisions creating property rights in the UP in favor of the OP
Rejection thereby effectively returns those property rights to the
Owner, whether Debtor or NDP.
When the Owner is the NDP, the Owner loses the benefit of
the payment stream in respect of those property rights, but has a
claim for breach that can be filed in the bankruptcy case of the
Debtor/OP and for which compensation will be provided commen-
surate with that provided other unsecured creditors of the Debt-
or/OP. The Debtor/OP is generally discharged from its payment
obligations under the lease or contract, but also loses the property
rights in the UP created thereby.
When the Owner is the Debtor, the NDP/OP loses the future
benefit of the property rights in the UP created by the contract or
lease, but is relieved of its obligations to make payment for those
property rights. In addition, the NDP/OP will have a claim for
breach of the contract or lease, and will receive compensation in
respect of its lost property interests.
When one of the parties has conveyed its property rights in the
UP to the STP, a new property interest has come into existence,
one that attaches to an interest in real or personal property and
that constitutes "collateral" under state law. Because the Bank-
ruptcy Code makes no provision for avoiding or rejecting the
interest of the STP, termination of the lease or contract upon
rejection in the bankruptcy case affects the existence of that
collateral only to the extent state law provides. By removing
limitations on the collateral imposed by the lease or contract,
rejection may change the value of the collateral, may change its
ownership by transferring limited interests in the UP from an OP
back to an Owner, or may even change its nature by transforming
it from one type of collateral into proceeds of that collateral. But
as a matter of statutory interpretation, bankruptcy policy, and most
importantly state property law, in any situation, the security interest
of the STP should remain valid-ride through-despite rejection of
an executory contract or unexpired lease.
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